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Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are emerging as a promising technology to foster
the design and the implementation of self-conﬁguring, self-healing, and cost-eﬀective
monitoring infrastructures. In the last decade, they have been used in several pilot
research applications, such as detection of ﬁres [1], object tracking [2, 3], security
monitoring [4], supply chain monitoring [5] and stability monitoring of civil engi-
neering structures, such as buildings [6], bridges [7], railroad tunnels [8], and dams
[9, 10]. The commercial use of WSN is expected to grow dramatically in the next
few years. However, industries in the ﬁeld of wired sensing and monitoring infras-
tructures are still questioning the adoption of WSN in critical applications, despite
attracted by their interesting features and by the possibility of reducing deployment
and management costs of more than one order of magnitude [8].
This gap between research achievements and industrial development is mainly due
to the little trust that companies repose in the reliability of WSNs. One of the
causes of this distrust is represented by the lack of work deﬁning critical application
requirements for WSN and by the absence of eﬀective approaches to be used at design
time for assessing non functional properties, such as WSN dependability.
Indeed, dependability assessment plays a central role in raising the level of trust
of WSNs for critical applications. WSNs are exposed to several faults due to both
wireless medium characteristic, the limited energy budget they are equipped with,
harsh environment [11], and cheap adopted hardware. Even if digital signals are less
1
2prone to electromagnetic interference, packets might be lost or delivered with errors,
sensors may be frozen to wrong ﬁxed values and nodes may periodically reset due
to malfunctioning. In these systems, data sensed by WSN nodes has to be properly
delivered to the sink node (i.e., the node responsible of data collection), in spite of
”changes” introduced during WSN operation (e.g., a node failure). The situation
is ﬁnally exacerbated by the highly dynamic nature of WSN and their proneness in
manifesting transient failures [11], and self-reconﬁgurations. Such a complex behavior
introduces several challenges for WSN developers. The design of WSNs is hardened
by the lack of eﬀective methods and approaches to master the intrinsic complexity
of WSN assessment, especially when aiming to design WSNs able to perform with a
persistent level of dependability while withstanding to manifesting changes, i.e. able
to perform with a given level of resiliency [12].
As discussed in Chapter 2, past research eﬀorts have been devoted to deﬁne the
concept of connection (or network) resiliency for computer networks [13] and ad-hoc
networks [14], i.e., the number of “changes”, in terms of node failures, that can be
accommodated while preserving a speciﬁc degree of connectivity in the network. How-
ever, while these concepts still apply to WSNs, they are not enough to characterize
the data-driven nature of WSNs. The service delivered by the WSN does not encom-
pass only the connection, but also the computation, i.e., even when sensor nodes are
potentially connected ( a path exists between nodes and the sink node), data losses
can still occur. To overcome this limit, this thesis deﬁnes the concept of data delivery
resiliency and qualiﬁes the concept of WSN resiliency as a non functional properties
composed by both connection resiliency and data delivery resiliency. Data delivery
resiliency is deﬁned in this thesis as the number of changes in terms of node failure
that the WSN can accommodate while preserving packet delivery eﬃciency greater
than a threshold.
3The concept of connection resiliency and data delivery resiliency are not interrelated.
While the concept of connection resiliency relates to the WSN topology, i.e. the
degree of path redundancy in the network, the concept of data delivery resiliency
is related to i) the computational load on nodes which may causes packet losses
due to buﬀer overrun, ii) application requirements, e.g. at least a given amount of
produced measurements must be delivered to the sink node, iii) routing and MAC
protocols impacting on the data delivery features and packet error rate, and iv) radio
interferences and packet loss/corruption phenomenon on the propagation medium.
Hence, assessing the data delivery resiliency as well as the connection resiliency is
a crucial task in designing dependable WSNs, since it could help to i) anticipate
critical choices e.g., concerning node placement, running software, routing and MAC
protocols, ii) mitigate risks, e.g., by forecasting the time when the WSN will not be
able to perform with a suitable level of resiliency, and iii) prevent money loss, e.g.,
providing a criteria to plan and schedule maintenance actions eﬀectively.
It is easy to ﬁgure out that resiliency assessment of WSNs is dramatically exacerbated
by the complexity of potential changes that may take place at runtime. The workload
impacts on the number of packets sent on the network. The path followed by packets
depends on the routing algorithm, on the topology, and on the wireless propagation
proﬁle (packets can be lost). The energy proﬁle is aﬀected by the workload, by the
number of forwarded packets, and by the battery technology. All above factors impact
on the failure behavior, e.g., a node can fail due to battery exhaustion. A node can
also fail independently, due to faults in the sensing hardware. In turn, a failure of
a node may induce a partition of the network into two or more subsets, involving
a large set of nodes to be unavailable, i.e., isolated, since they are no more able to
deliver data to the sink. Clearly, such high degree of inter-dependence complicates
the assessment task, by dramatically increasing the number of variables and dynamics
4to encompass. Finally, but not less important, resiliency assessment cannot neglect
actual hardware/software platforms features and the sensing hardware being used:
diﬀerent power consumptions and failure rates are indeed experienced when varying
the underlying platforms, such as sensing hardware, radio chip and node operating
system.
Resiliency assessment cannot deviate from the use of models. State-of-art techniques
for the assessment of non-functional properties, such as power consumption or de-
pendability are mostly based on behavioral simulators and analytical models, as
deeply discussed in Chapter 2.
WSN Behavioral simulators, such as ns-2 [15] or TOSSIM [16], are close to real
WSNs. They typically belong to the the ﬁnal user (e.g. the deployer) domain of
knowledge and allow to reproduce the expected behavior of single WSN nodes on
the basis of the real application planned to execute. However, they are not designed
to express and to evaluate non-functional properties. Such an analysis requires to
evaluate statistical estimators and hence it needs several simulations runs in order
to achieve results with an acceptable conﬁdence. This in turn increases the time
needed for the simulation by order of magnitudes, given the low-level of detail of
these approaches.
Analytical models, such as Petri nets and Markov chains, are the reference for re-
siliency assessment techniques. They have been successfully used for decades for the
assessment of computer systems, including WSNs [17, 18]. However, the highly dy-
namic nature of WSNs requires the deﬁnition of detailed and complex models which
are diﬃcult to develop and hardly re-usable for diﬀerent scenarios For instance, if a
modeling team would invest for a ﬁne grain model of a WSN, taking into account
software, routing issues and hardware platforms, even a tiny change in the design
parameters of the considered WSNs, such as the software or the topology, would
5probably require a modeling phase ex-novo, incurring in unaﬀordable design costs,
while such aspects are well and easily reproduced in behavioral models. As matter of
fact, the assessment of WSN resiliency following a mere analytical approach requires
strong simplifying assumptions that often lead to rather abstract results.
To overcome the limitation of available approaches, this thesis proposes a novel and
holistic approach for the resiliency assessment of WSNs. Key focus of the approach
is the holistic resiliency assessment, i.e., the comprehensive assessment performed
by taking into account all subsystems and inter-related factors concurring to the
behavior of the WSN. Hence, an important step toward the resiliency assessment of
a WSN is to evaluate: i) how the node workload, hardware platforms, topology and
routing protocols impact on the failure proneness of nodes and of the network, and,
vice-versa, ii) how node and network failures impacts on the nominal behavior of the
WSN (e.g., how the failure of a node mutates the behavior of running workload or
routing protocols).
It is clear that the failure of a single node may impact on the behavior of the overall
network in an unmanageable number of ways. Conversely, diﬀerent user choices (e.g.,
the node workload and the routing algorithm) inﬂuence the nominal behavior as well
as the failure behavior of every single node. To master this complexity, the approach
separates the assessment of the failure behavior from the evaluation of the nominal
behavior by considering i) a set of parametric analytical failure models, and ii) a
WSN behavioral model, respectively.
Initially, the behavioral model is exploited to conﬁgure the WSNs in terms of hard-
ware platform, topology, routing and MAC protocols, and to study the nominal
behavior of the software, included the OS, and the power consumption of the nodes.
Evaluations performed with the behavioral models are used to gather values for fail-
ure model parameters of the WSN under study, such as the packet forwarding rate
6of each node. Then the power of the analytical failure model is exploited to evaluate
a set of metrics of interest such as the resiliency. However, it is not diﬃcult to realize
that some parameters are dynamic over time, i.e., their values need to be dynamically
updated during the assessment, driven by the failure model. To exemplify consider a
node X that stops working, due to battery exhaustion. After this failure, the routing
tree needs to be updated, and traﬃc patterns in the network change consequently.
Diﬀerent traﬃc patterns in turn cause a diﬀerent nodes battery discharge rate which
ﬁnally aﬀects the lifetime of individual nodes, and likely, of the WSN. A possible
solution would be to stop the failure model at each change event, and to step back
to the behavioral simulation in order to re-compute network parameters coherently
with new working condition, however, at the price of unaﬀordable simulation costs.
For this reason, the proposed approach delegates the eﬀort of computing the varia-
tion of dynamic parameters to an additional component, here referred as External
Engine which orchestrates the evolution of the failure model. The external engine
can be regarded as a supervision entity encapsulating and managing aspects that are
generally diﬃcult to express at the level of abstraction of analytical models. Hence,
the engine is essential to keep models simple, general and reusable.
The use of the External Engine decouples analytical models from “changes“ man-
agement issues, allowing to simplify the failure model which can adapt to each man-
ifesting change, transparently. Moreover, the assessment is more realistic since it
encompasses all network/application related parameters which are likely to change
during WSN lifetime, without the need of strong simplifying assumption.
The proposed approach is also conceived to reduce the modeling eﬀort of ﬁnal users by
automating the creation of failure models, metrics to be estimated, and experiments
to be performed. To this aim, information collected after the behavioral model simu-
lation, concerning adopted node and sensing platform, radio chip, batteries workload
7and topology are exploited to specialize a speciﬁc set of templates from a Failure
Model Template Library. Failure Model Templates are skeletons of failure models,
described by means of XML ﬁles, which are produced una tantum by a domain ex-
pert. They are composed of i) a well deﬁned interface, ii) a part depending on the
speciﬁc WSN , and iii) a ﬁxed part. Well deﬁned interface are used to compose
complex models by joining diﬀerent sub-models together. Template parts depending
on the speciﬁc WSNs are the objective of the automated failure model generation
since they need to be generated according to the considered WSN. For instance, after
the behavioral simulation, a model is generated for each sensor node with as many
output links to other node failure models as its neighbors in the topology conﬁgured
by the user. Generated models are then populated with parameters which values
reﬂect the WSN studied in the behavioral simulation, e.g., for each nodes, generated
output links models are populated with packet loss probabilities which values have
been evaluated during the behavioral simulation. The generation phase ends by pro-
ducing a XML description for each generated models, which are completed with a
XML description of metrics and experiments of interests to perform (e.g., selected by
the user, consistently with his/her interests). Finally, a parser translates the XML
descriptors in a format compliant to the selected analytical model formalism, i.e.,
specializing the produced XML for the modeling framework chosen for performing
experiments of interest.
Relying on an automated modeling phase, the proposed approach allows ﬁnal users
(i.e., WSN developers) to work within their knowledge domain, without requiring
speciﬁc modeling and/or programming skills. In other terms, developers interact
with artifacts that are related to their domain, such as behavioral simulators. Finally,
interested industries may release failure model libraries upon the release of WSN
hardware, following the same approach as for HDL libraries.
8In the context of this thesis, Stochastic Activity Networks (SAN) formalism [19] and
the Mobius [20] framework are adopted to develop and simulate WSNs failure models,
due to their ﬂexibility and extensibility features.
The eﬀectiveness of the approach is shown by means of a resiliency assessment cam-
paign based on a set of hypothetic, real-world WSNs. As it will detailed later, the ap-
proach allows to anticipate design choices by evaluating the resiliency under diﬀerent
failure conditions and scenarios, workload behavior, and adopted routing algorithms,
using the same set of parametric SAN models. The approach can be adopted by
a hypothetic user, who can exploit simulation results to ﬁne-tune his applications,
for instance, selecting an appropriate routing algorithm and/or application workload
which make the WSN able to fulﬁll given requirements, e.g. in terms of resiliency.
The proposed approach may help also in the case of already deployed WSN, for in-
stance, by forecasting the time when the WSN will exhibit a degraded behavior by
deviating from its speciﬁcations helping to schedule maintenance actions in advance.
This thesis is organized in 7 chapters as it follows. Chapter 1 provides a brief overview
of WSNs and their applications, stressing their requirements and the importance of
resiliency in the considered scenarios. Chapter 2 analyzes the state of the art in
the ﬁeld of WSN simulation and dependability assessment. Chapter 3 provides the
deﬁnition of both connection and data resiliency. Chapter 4 is focused on the holistic
approach, objective of this thesis, and it presents challenges and solutions for the
orchestration of the behavioral and analytical simulation and for the automated fail-
ure model generation. Chapter 5 presents the behavioral models and the parameters
needed to generate the failure model. Chapter 6 presents the failure models and the
followed modeling approach. Chapter 7 ﬁnally provides a set of case studies aiming
at showing the eﬀectiveness of the approach concerning diﬀerent WSN deployments.
Chapter 1
Dependability of Wireless
Sensor Networks
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are emerging as one of the most compelling research areas,
with profound impact on technological development. WSNs have been used with success into
more and more critical application scenarios, such as structural monitoring of civil engineer-
ing structures, where the dependability of WSNs becomes an important factor, discriminating
the success of large-scale industrial applications. However, unreliable hardware, installed soft-
ware, energy consumption and topology are the major constraints aﬀecting Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) resiliency. For this reason, dependability evaluation of WSNs is gaining
popularity since it could help to reduce risks and money losses by forecasting the resiliency of
a WSN before the deployment. This Chapter brieﬂy introduces this issue, WSNs applications
and requirements. Finally, it introduces the dependability requirements of WSN, motivating
the approach presented in this thesis.
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
Recent advances in wireless communications and electronics have enabled the devel-
opment of low-cost, low-power, multi-functional sensors, capable of local computation
and equipped with short range radio transmitting devices[21]. The main purpose of
a Wireless Sensor Network as a whole is to serve as an interface to the real world,
providing physical information such as temperature, light, radiation, and others, to
a computer system.
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WSN are expected to be a breakthrough in the way natural phenomenon are ob-
served: the accuracy of observations will be considerably improved, leading to a
better understanding of the monitored environment.
These networks have a simple structure: there are dozens up to 100s of elements,
called ”sensor nodes” able to sense physical features of their surroundings or to
monitoring a set of items. WSN nodes exchange information on environment in
order to build a global view of the monitored items/regions which is made accessible
to the external user through one or more gateway node(s), named base station or sink
node(s) [22]. Sensor nodes are often referred as smart sensors or smart dust because
of their processing, power, and memory capabilities [23, 24, 25, 26]. The small size of
sensors (about the size of a coin) allows them to be easily embedded into materials
[25] or deployed in a mobile scenarios such as remote health care, cars, or ﬂoats over
water [27].
A WSN typically operates by stepping through the following phases: i) sensor nodes
acquire sensed data, ii) data is locally processed, iii) data is routed in a multi-hop
fashion, iv) data is delivered to the sink node, and v) data is forwarded by the sink
node to a conventional network, e.g. Internet [26].
Sensor networks may be organized in two basic architectures, hierarchical and ﬂat.
In ﬂat conﬁgurations, all the nodes participate in both the decision-making processes
and the internal protocols, like routing. On the other hand, in hierarchical conﬁg-
urations the network can be divided into clusters, or group of nodes, where all the
organizational decisions, like data aggregation, are made by a single entity called
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cluster head.
The main components of a sensor node are its microprocessor, its communication
chip, its integrated sensors, and limited mass storage. It is also possible to have
support for external components, such as GPS chips or external ﬂash cards, or a
better security support, like radio chips with hardware implementations of cryptog-
raphy mechanisms such as AES. The main drawback of WSN sensor nodes is the
restricted resource of energy leading to limited lifetimes. This fact motivates atten-
tion and eﬀort the research community has devoted to the development of low power
consumption techniques, not only at MAC layer, but also at network and application
layers.
1.2 WSN Requirements
Lifetime
In most application scenarios, a majority, if not the totality of the nodes are self-
powered, and hence, in the best, they are able to survive for a limited time. The
most common adopted lifetime metric is related to the time till a certain percentage
of surviving nodes in the network falls below a given threshold [28]. When a WSN
should be considered non-functional, however, is application speciﬁc.
Area Coverage
Area coverage is deﬁned as the ratio between the number of up, running, and con-
nected nodes at a given instant of time, over the number of initially deployed sensors.
Due to the aging and wear out process of nodes, the area coverage is a decreasing
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function of the time. WSN applications deﬁne the minimal level of area coverage
to assure so that the observed phenomenon can be monitored with acceptable conﬁ-
dence.
Timeliness
In environment monitoring applications is often required to correlate samples coming
across diﬀerent nodes in order to gather combined measurements. in such WSNs It
is a common practice to compute Fast Fourier Transforms across diﬀerent nodes, for
instance upon a vibration event of the monitored structure[7] . In this case, nodes
must be synchronized in order to take part to the distributed computation correctly,
i.e. by providing samples acquired within a bounded interval of time. In WSNs,
nodes clock drifts apart over time due to inaccuracies in oscillators. High-precision
synchronization mechanisms must be provided to continually compensate for these
inaccuracies, e.g., by means of synchronization protocols, but this is in contrast with
lifetime, since such protocols often require periodic exchange of extra radio packets.
Data Delivery
The main mission of a typical WSN is to collect environmental data and to send
measurements to the sink node. Depending on the speciﬁc application, it may be
fundamental to collect at least a speciﬁc amount of data in order to fulﬁll applica-
tion requirements. However, despite at the deployment, the WSN is able to deliver
a suﬃcient amount of data to the sink node, interferences and failures may force
topology reconﬁguration that may impact on the delivery eﬃciency. Consequently,
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it is important to evaluate the eﬃciency of WSNs in delivering data to the sink in
order to detect whether a WSN is still able to behave as expected. Moreover, the
evaluation of data delivery features may be used for topology control purposes, for
instance, enabling spare nodes or switching to a routing policy able to deal with new
working condition.
1.3 Critical Applications
The ﬁeld of WSNs oﬀers a rich, multi-disciplinary area of research, in which a variety
of tools and concepts can be employed to address a diverse set of applications. As
such, many potentials of this ﬁeld have been under study both in academia and in
the industry. Only recently they have become a technology which is more and more
envisioned in real applications, included industrial systems or critical scenarios as a
good opportunity to drastically reduce installation, management, and maintenance
costs and related times.
According to the European Commission, Critical scenarios consist of ”[...] those
physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if
disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or
economic well-being of citizens. [...]” [29].
The number of critical scenarios where sensor networks can be used is incredibly
broad. It is not the primary aim of this thesis to overview and detail the large
spectrum of existing critical applications in the ﬁeld; interested readers could refer
to good surveys in the literature [21, 30].
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Figure 1.1: WSN applications domains and basic applicative requirements.
Rather, in this section we review ﬁve main WSN application classes: environment
monitoring, security monitoring, object tracking, ambient intelligence and body net-
work applications. The majority of critical WSN applications will fall into one of
these class templates. Figure 1.1 provides a view of the considered WSN application
domains which can be classiﬁed according to three main parameters: density of the
deployment, scale of the deployment, and sensing capabilities of the network. De-
pending on the objective of the deployment, WSNs may be equipped of a number
of nodes spacing from few dozen (e.g. Body Sensor Networks) up to thousands (e.g.
Environment monitoring). Nodes may be deployed in a small area with high density
or be scattered on a large region. Finally, for each application scenario, diﬀerent
requirements must be met, as reported in Figure 1.1 and as further discussed in the
following sections.
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1.3.1 Environment Monitoring
Environment monitoring applications generally consist of deploying a number of sen-
sors in the ﬁeld to periodically measure meteorological and hydrological parameters,
such as wind speed and direction. Most of them change relatively slowly in time,
which allows for sparse sampling (one sample every two to ﬁve minutes is most often
suﬃcient). However, as interesting phenomena, such as rock slides or avalanches, oc-
cur seldom and are diﬃcult to predict, deployments must last long enough to capture
them, and must assure a reliable delivery of gathered data to the sink node. Thus,
requirements of an environmental monitoring system are lifetime and data delivery
resiliency. Achieving resiliency is diﬃcult because packet losses are more likely to
happen during harsh weather conditions (e.g., heavy rain, intense cold) which are
at the same time the most interesting episodes for data analysis. Moreover, due to
the multi-hop organizations of WSNs, as the network ages, it is very likely to ob-
serve node failures that may cause disconnections of nodes to the sink and network
partitions.
All these requirements are especially important when deploying a network in remote
and diﬃcult-to-access places. For instance, one of the SensorScope deployments
[31] occurred in high mountain, in collaboration with authorities. A helicopter was
required for carrying hardware and people. Going back to the site a few days later
because a battery is depleted or because a station needs to be manually rebooted is
obviously inconceivable.
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1.3.2 Security Monitoring
Diﬀerently from environment monitoring, WSN Security monitoring applications do
not collect any data, and are classiﬁed as ”report by exception” networks. The
common task of each node is to frequently check the status of its sensors, and to
transmit a data report strictly only when an exception is detected, such as security
breaches or unauthorized access to an environment. Nodes are typically equipped
with both permanent and backup power sources. This has a signiﬁcant impact on
the optimal network architecture and on nodes lifetime that is not as critical as for
environment monitoring. The timeliness and data delivery resiliency are the primary
system requirements.
1.3.3 Object Tracking
The purpose of this class of WSN applications is to provide an eﬀective solutions for
the tracking of mobile objects [3] by using a combination of WSNs and radio fre-
quency identiﬁcation/positioning technologies. With WSNs, objects can be tracked
by simply tagging them with a small sensor node. The sensor node will be tracked
as it moves through a ﬁeld of sensor nodes that are deployed in the environment at
known locations. Instead of sensing environmental data, these nodes will be deployed
to sense the RF messages of the nodes attached to various objects.
Unlike sensing or security WSN, node tracking applications will continually have
topology changes as nodes move through the network. While the connectivity among
nodes at ﬁxed locations will remain relatively stable, the connectivity to mobile
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nodes will be continually changing. Additionally, the set of nodes being tracked will
continually change as objects enter and leave the system. Timeliness in detecting new
moving objects and in managing hand-oﬀs as the tracked objects move is the ﬁrst
requirement of such WSN applications. Moreover, a full coverage of the monitored
area and reliable delivery of data related to tracked object is essential.
1.3.4 Ambient Intelligence
Ambient Intelligence (AmI) is a paradigm that applies to a number of vertical do-
mains. AmI is a term coined by Philips management to conjure up a vision of an
imminent future in which persons are surrounded by a multitude of ﬁne grained
distributed networks comprising sensors, and computational devices that are unob-
trusively embedded in everyday objects such as furniture, clothes, and vehicles, and
that together create electronic habitats that are sensitive, adaptive and responsive to
the presence of people [32, 33]. Examples of Ami applications are smart oﬃces and
buildings [34]. In smart oﬃces, it is possible to record the movement and meeting
patterns of employees, and also answer queries related to the employees (such as their
location) and related to the rooms (such as their temperature).
AmI applications are aﬀected by several new treats due to mobility of resources [35,
36] and to the peculiarities of domains [37]. AmI requirements typically encompass
data delivery features, timeliness and lifetime.
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1.3.5 Body Sensor Networks
The term BSN is ﬁrst coined in [38] in order to bring together scientists from diﬀerent
disciplines such as computing, electronics, bioengineering and medicine for address-
ing the general issues related to using wearable/wireless and implantable sensors on
the human body. The basic structure of BSN consists on a set of wireless physi-
ological sensors, such as body temperature, blood pressure and oxygen saturation,
cardiac activity (ECG), and encephalic activity (EEG). Sensors are used jointly to
measure and monitor remotely the status of a patient. It is also possible to use BSN
in helping assisted-living and independent-living residents by continuously and un-
obtrusively monitoring health-related factors such as their heart-rate, heart-rhythm,
and temperature.
Requirements of BSN consists of limited and predictable time latency and reliable
transmission of sensed data and alarms. Moreover, area coverage is of paramount
importance, since BSN are constituted by a very limited number of sensor nodes,
without any overlap between sensed area or sensed parameters.
1.4 Challenges
Although the technology for WSNs is relatively mature, and WSN have been em-
ployed in several pilot research applications, real large scale applications are com-
pletely lacking. This is in part due to a number of still unsolved problems aﬄicting
WSNs.
A number of smart sensor prototypes have been designed and implemented by the
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academic research community. The most famous of such prototypes are probably the
Berkley Motes [39] and Smart Dust [25]. Later on, many academic interdisciplinary
projects have been funded (and are currently being funded) to actually deploy and
utilize sensor networks. One such example is the Great Duck Island project, in which
a WSN has been deployed to monitor the habitat of the nesting petrels without any
human interference with animals [11].
Smart sensor nodes are also being produced and commercialized by some electronic
manufacturer, such as Crossbow, Philips, Siemens, STMicroelectronic.
There is also a considerable standardization activity in the ﬁeld if WSNs. The most
notable eﬀort in this direction is the IEEE 802.15.4 standard which deﬁnes the phys-
ical and MAC layer protocols for remote monitoring and control, as well as sensor
network applications. ZigBee Alliance is an industry consortium with the goal of
promoting the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
Other than standardization, main challenges related to WSN implementation are
reported in the following.
Energy Conservation
Because of the reduced size of the sensor nodes, the battery has low capacity and
the available energy is very limited. Despite the scarcity of energy, the network is
expected to operate for a relatively long time. Given that replacing/reﬁlling batteries
is usually impossible or very expensive, one of the primary challenges is to maximize
the WSN lifetime while preserving acceptable performances.
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Low-quality communication
WSN are often deployed in harsh environments, and sometimes they operate under
extreme weather conditions. In these situations, the quality of the radio communi-
cation might be extremely poor and performing the requested collective sensing task
might become very diﬃcult.
Operation in hostile environments
In many scenarios, WSN are expected to operate under critical environmental con-
ditions, which translates in an accelerated failure rate of sensor nodes. Thus, it is
essential that sensor nodes are carefully designed, and the WSN assessed under real
failure assumptions. Furthermore, the protocols for network operation should be
resilient to sensor fault, which must be considered in these scenarios a norm rather
than an exception.
Security Attacks
As networks grow, the vulnerability of network nodes to physical and software attack
increases. Attackers can also obtain their own commodity sensor nodes and induce the
network to accept them as legitimate nodes, or they can claim multiple identities for
an altered node. Once in control of a few nodes inside the network, the adversary can
then mount a variety of attacks, for instance, falsiﬁcation of sensor data, extraction
of private sensed information from sensor network readings, and denial of service
attacks. Therefore, routing protocols must be resilient against compromised nodes
that behave maliciously. Ensuring that sensed information stays within the sensor
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network and is accessible only to trusted parties is an essential step toward achieving
security. Data encryption and access control is one approach. Another is to restrict
the network is ability to gather data at a detail level that could compromise privacy.
For example, in a healthcare environment, storing data in an anonymous format
and removing any personal referencing information. Another approach is to process
queries in the sensor network in a distributed manner so that no single node can
observe the query results in their entirety. In this case security comes at the price of
a reduced lifetime due to the extra overhead induced in the network.
Maintenance Cost
The initial deployment and conﬁguration is only the ﬁrst step in the WSN lifecycle.
In WSN where deployment is expected to surpass the lifetime of batteries, the total
cost of management for a system may have more to do with the maintenance cost
than the initial deployment cost. Throughout the lifetime of a deployment, nodes
may be relocated or replaced due to outages, and discharged batteries. In addition,
reintegrating the failed nodes adds further labor expenses. An approach to limit
interventions would be to increase the lifetime by adopting a trigger-based sampling
strategy: sensors start to acquire data only when given conditions are met. However,
this approach introduces a further coordination problem among sensors, e.g. ,nodes
monitoring the same area must agree on the triggered event, synchronize their clock,
and start to sample data coordinately. Since access costs are dominant over in-situ
costs, it is important, therefore i) to identify sources of maintenance related costs and
to reduce them, and ii) to schedule maintenance so that once the network is accessed,
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a convenient number of nodes are maintained and hence, the overall maintenance cost
optimized.
Lack of easy to commercialize applications
Nowadays, several chip makers and electronic companies started the production of
sensor nodes. However, it is much more diﬃcult for these companies to commercialize
applications based on WSN. Selling applications, instead of relatively cheap sensors,
would be much more proﬁtable for industry. Unfortunately, most sensor network
application scenarios are very speciﬁc, and companies would have little or no proﬁt
in developing very speciﬁc applications, since the potential buyers would be very few.
1.5 Resiliency in WSN Critical Applications
The commercial use of WSN is expected to grow dramatically in the next few years,
however, industries in the ﬁeld of wired sensing and monitoring infrastructures are
still questioning the adoption of WSN in critical applications, despite attracted by
their interesting features and by the possibility of reducing deployment and manage-
ment costs of more than one order of magnitude [8].
This gap between research achievements and industrial development is mainly due to
the little trust that companies repose in the resiliency of WSNs. Resiliency as been
recently deﬁned as [12]: the persistence of dependability when facing ”changes”. This
change of perspective leads to new requirements of modern fault tolerant systems,
such as the ability of accommodating unforeseen environmental perturbations or
disturbances.
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WSNs are exposed to several faults due to both wireless medium characteristic, the
battery exhaustion of a sensor, harsh environment [11] and cheap hardware. Even if
digital signals are less prone to electromagnetic interference, packets might be lost
or delivered with errors, sensors may be frozen to wrong ﬁxed values and nodes may
periodically reset due to malfunctioning. In these systems, data sensed by WSN
nodes has to be properly delivered to the sink node, in spite of ”changes” introduced
during WSN operation (e.g., a node failure, or a route update). This situation is
further exacerbated considering the the fail silent behavior of a sensor, that makes
diﬃcult the detection of malfunctioning or failed nodes. As a result, the utilization
of a WSN for critical applications introduces speciﬁc resiliency requirements, which
relate to those reported in Figure 1.1.
Connection Resiliency
Path redundancy and self-organization are cost-free features provided by WSNs. Sen-
sor nodes are arranged in an ad hoc manner providing a number of potential redun-
dant paths toward the sink, depending on the number of their neighbors. However,
real installations are often subjected to speciﬁc deployment constraints such as num-
ber and density of sensor nodes. For instance, WSNs designed for bridges, towers and
buildings monitoring are typically organized following an in-line, grid or two chain
topology due to site constraints, limiting the number of redundant paths in the net-
work ( a node may reach only a very low number of neighbors) [17] . Consequently, a
failure of an inner node in the topology is likely to cause the isolation of a set of nodes.
Hence, judicious selection of node position and density is crucial to optimize the path
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redundancy and to enforce the connectivity resiliency of the WSNs. Referring to the
requirements showed in Figure 1.1, connection resiliency relates to lifetime and area
coverage.
Data Delivery Resiliency
In order for fulﬁll application requirements, such that for structural monitoring and
analysis or security monitoring, at least a minimum amount of measurements have
to be gathered during each measurement step, despite communication and/or sensor
faults. For example, if n sensors, forming a cluster, are used to cover a pillar of a
bridge, at least k-out-of-n sensor readings have to be delivered to the sink node in
time, at each measurement step. The value of k have to be selected with respect to
the physical characteristics of the structure’s section. Moreover, the k correct sensors
cannot be arbitrary chosen among the n available sensors. In other terms, other than
providing path redundancy to the sink, data delivery reliability is essential if not
necessary in most of WSN applications. Indeed, it may be possible that, despite
existing paths reaching the sink, a node is not able to deliver its measurements due
to buﬀer overﬂows, packet corruptions and application errors. Typically, to face this
issue, acknowledgement based routing protocol or epidemic routing protocols such as
ﬂooding are used to decrease the probability of packet loss throughout the network.
However, such approaches strongly inﬂuence the WSN lifetime and time latency in
data delivery due to the overhead they cause in the forwarding nodes. Referring to
the requirements showed in Figure 1.1, data delivery resiliency relates to timeliness
and data delivery features.
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1.5.1 The Need of a Holistic Approach
Resiliency assessment of WSNs by means of fault forecasting represents an intriguing
research issue indirectly related to the deﬁned requirements. Its proper application
could help to i) anticipate critical choices e.g., concerning node placement, running
software, routing and MAC protocols, ii) mitigate risks, e.g., by forecasting the time
when the WSN will not be able to perform with a suitable level of resiliency, and iii)
prevent money loss, e.g., providing a criteria to plan and schedule maintenance actions
eﬀectively. However, it is easy to ﬁgure out that resiliency assessment of WSNs
is dramatically exacerbated by the complexity of potential changes that may take
place at runtime. The workload, included the use of aggregation/fusion algorithms,
impacts on the number of packets sent on the network. The path followed by packets
depends on the routing algorithm, on the topology, and on the wireless medium
(packets can be lost). The energy proﬁle is aﬀected by the workload, by the number
of forwarded packets, and by the battery technology. All above factors impact on
the failure behavior, e.g., a node can fail due to battery exhaustion. A node can also
fail independently, due to faults in the sensing hardware. In turn, a failure of a node
may induce a partition of the network into two or more subsets, involving a large
set of nodes to be unavailable, i.e., isolated, hence, unable to send acquired data to
the sink. Clearly, such high degree of inter-dependence complicates the assessment
task, by dramatically increasing the number of variables and dynamics to encompass.
Finally, but not less important, resiliency assessment must also take into account
actual hardware/software platforms features and the sensing hardware being used:
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diﬀerent power consumptions and failure rates are indeed experienced when varying
the underlying platforms, such as sensing hardware, radio chip and node operating
system.
Resiliency assessment of WSN cannot deviate from the use of models. Although vari-
ous interesting dependability evaluation techniques and tools have been developed in
the last decades, still a little attention is devoted to deﬁne approaches able to master
the intrinsic complexity of WSN resiliency assessment. State-of-art techniques for
the assessment of non-functional properties, such as power consumption or depend-
ability attributes are mostly based on behavioral simulators and analytical models,
as deeply discussed in Chapter 2.
WSN Behavioral simulators, such as ns-2 [15] or TOSSIM [16], are closer to real
WSNs. They allow to reproduce the expected behavior of every single WSN node on
the basis of the real application planned to execute. However, they are not designed
to express and to evaluate non-functional properties. Such analysis would require to
evaluate statistical estimators and hence several simulation runs in order to achieve
results with an acceptable conﬁdence. This in turn would increase the time needed
for the simulation by order of magnitudes, given the low-level of detail of these
approaches.
Indeed, analytical models, such as Petri nets and Markov chains, are the reference
for resiliency assessment techniques. They have been successfully used for decades
for the assessment of computer systems, including WSNs [17]. However, the highly
dynamic nature of WSNs requires the deﬁnition of detailed and complex models which
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are diﬃcult to develop and hardly re-usable for diﬀerent scenarios For instance, if a
modeling team would invest for a ﬁne grain model of a WSN to design, taking into
account software, routing issues and hardware platforms, even a tiny change in the
design parameters of the considered WSNs, such as the software or the topology,
would probably require a modeling phase ex-novo, incurring in unaﬀordable design
costs. As matter of fact, the assessment of WSN resiliency following a mere analytical
approach requires strong simplifying assumptions that often lead to rather abstract
results.
Chapter 2
WSN Assessment: Models,
Tools and Related Work
While measurement is a valuable option for assessing an existing system or a prototype, it is
not a feasible option during the system design and implementation phases. Model-based eval-
uation has proven to be an appealing alternative. Several modeling paradigms, various tech-
niques and tools for model evaluation are currently used in the ﬁeld of WSNs. This Chapter
revises modeling approaches and tools currently used in the ﬁeld of dependability modeling,
network simulation and WSN assessment, including international project and related studies.
2.1 Dependability Modeling and Modeling Formalisms
Research in dependability analysis has led to a variety of models, each focusing on
particular levels of abstraction and/or system characteristics.
Dependability modeling and analysis assumes that the dynamics of the system can be
described by temporal random variables. Through dependability modeling it possible
to perform an evaluation of the system behavior with respect to fault occurrence or
activation (fault-forecasting) which is of paramount importance to evaluate a set of
metrics of interests such dependability attributes (See Appendix A). Hence, models
can give immediate feedback to the designers who can timely improve the design.
Models parameters are however based on past experiences on same systems, and
28
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these parameters can be often invalidated as the modeled system ages during the
simulation.
Traditional model formalisms used in the dependability analysis of stochastic systems
can be divided in two broad categories [40]: 1) combinatorial models (e.g. Reliability
Block Diagrams[41], Fault-tree [42, 43]), 2) state-space based models (Markov chains
[44], Petri nets [45], Stochastic Activity Networks [46]).
2.2 Combinatorial Modeling Formalisms
Combinatorial models assume the parts of the system to be statistically indepen-
dent and achieve high analytical tractability combined with a low modeling power.
Combinatorial methods are quite limited in the stochastic behavior that they can ex-
press. Despite several extensions that have been made to combinatorial models, they
do not easily capture certain features, such as stochastic dependence and imperfect
fault coverage.
2.2.1 Reliability Block Diagrams
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) consists of a graphical structure with two types of
nodes: blocks representing system components and dummy nodes for connections be-
tween the components. Edges and dummy nodes model the operational dependency
of a system on its components. At any instant of time, if there exists a path in the
system from the start dummy node to the end dummy node, then the system is con-
sidered operational; otherwise, the system is considered failed. A failed component
blocks all the paths on which it appears. RBDs thus map the operational dependency
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of a system on its components and not the actual physical structure of the system.
Series-Parallel RBDs are useful not only because they are very intuitive, but also
because they can be solved in linear time [47]. Such RBDs are quite frequently used
in reliability and availability modeling [48, 49] and many software packages exist that
support construction and solution of RBD models [47, 50].
2.2.2 Fault Trees
Fault Trees are acyclic graphs with internal nodes that are logic gates (e.g., AND,
OR, k-of-n) and external nodes (leaves or basic events) that represent system compo-
nents. The edges represent the ﬂow of failure information in terms of Boolean entities
(TRUE and FALSE or 0s and 1s). Typically, if a component has failed, a TRUE is
transmitted; otherwise, a FALSE is transmitted. The edge connections determine the
operational dependency of the system on the components. At any instant of time,
the logic value at the root node determines whether or not the system is operational.
If shared (repeated) nodes (nodes that share a common input) are not allowed, then
the acyclic structure is a rooted tree. Fault trees without shared nodes are equivalent
to series-parallel RBDs [49], but when shared nodes (or repeated events) are allowed,
fault trees are more powerful [51].Fault trees have been extensively used in reliabil-
ity and availability modeling [52, 53, 54, 55], safety modeling [56], and modeling of
software fault tolerance[57].
Evolution of FTs are Dynamic Fault Trees [58] which are based on the deﬁnition
of new gates (Priority-AND, Functional Dependency and Warm Spare) that induce
temporal as well as statistical dependencies. The quantitative analysis of the DFT
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consists in exploding minimal modules of dynamic gates into their state-space rep-
resentation and computing the related occurrence probability by means of a CTMC
(Continuous Time Markov Chains) [44].
2.3 State Space Based Modeling Formalisms
State-space methods are much more comprehensive than combinatorial methods and
rely on the enumeration of the whole set of possible states of the system and on the
speciﬁcation of the possible transitions among them. The main drawback of these
techniques is the well known state explosion problem, due to the circumstance that
the dimension of the state space grows exponentially with the number of components.
2.3.1 Markov models
Markov models consider the system behavior being modeled as a Markov process, on
a discrete state space. Markov Chains, Discrete Time Markov Chains are example of
formalisms bases on Markov models.
Markov models have been extensively used for dependability analysis of hardware
systems [48, 49, 47] real-time system performance in the presence of failures [59, 60],
combined analysis of hardware-software reliability [61, 62], system performance and
performability analysis [47, 63].
For complex systems with large numbers of components, the number of system states
can grow prohibitively large. This is called the largeness problem for Markov models.
A major objection to the use of Markov models in the evaluation of performance and
dependability behavior of systems is the assumption that the sojourn (holding) time
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in any state is exponentially distributed. The exponential distribution has many
useful properties that lead to analytic tractability, but it does not always realistically
represent the observed distribution functions.
2.3.2 Stochastic Petri nets
Stochastic Petri nets (SPNs) [64] and extensions have been developed as extensions
to Petri nets (originally introduced by C. A. Petri in 1962) with timed transitions for
which the ﬁring time distributions are assumed to be exponential. SPNs have been
extensively used in the area of dependability evaluation [48] due to the small size of
their descriptions and their visual/conceptual clarity.
The ﬁring of transitions is assumed to take an exponentially distributed amount of
time. Given the initial marking of an SPN, all the markings as well as the transition
rates can be derived, under the condition that the number of tokens in every
In the last two decades many extensions to the basic SPN model have been proposed
to enhance its modeling power and ﬂexibility of use. The most popular model of
this type is called generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPNs) [65]. More ﬂexible ﬁring
rules have also been proposed, most notably the introduction of gates in stochastic
activity networks (SANs)[66].
2.3.3 Stochastic Activity Networks
Stochastic activity networks [66] have been used since the mid-1980s for perfor-
mance, dependability, and performability evaluation. This formalism is more power-
ful and ﬂexible than most other stochastic extensions of Petri nets such as SPNs and
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GSPNs. SANs permit the representation of concurrency, timeliness, fault-tolerance
and degradable performance in a single model [66].
Informally SANs are generalized Petri nets and provide a graphical representation
consisting of places, timed and instantaneous activities, input and output gates.
Timed activities represent the activities of the modeled system whose durations im-
pact the system’s ability to perform. The amount of time to complete a timed activity
can follow a speciﬁc distribution, such as Exponential, and Weibull. Instantaneous
activities, on the other hand, represent system activities that, relative to the per-
formance variable in question, are completed in a negligible amount of time. Cases
associated with activities permit the realization of two types of spatial uncertainty.
Uncertainty about which activities are enabled in a certain state is realized by cases
associated with intervening instantaneous activities, represented by circles on the
right side of an activity.
Uncertainty about the next state assumed upon completion of a timed activity is
realized by cases associated with that activity. Gates are introduced to permit greater
ﬂexibility in deﬁning enabling and completion rules.
SANs provides two diﬀerent types of gates: input and output gates. input gates, each
of which has a ﬁnite set of inputs and one output. Associated with each input gate are
an n-ary computable predicate and an n-ary computable partial function over the set
of natural numbers which are called the enabling predicate and the input function,
respectively. The input function is deﬁned for all values for which the enabling
predicate is true. Output gates have ﬁnite set of outputs and one input. Associated
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with each output gate is an n-ary computable function on the set of natural numbers,
called the output function. The use of gates permits a greater ﬂexibility in specifying
enabling conditions and completion rules than simple SPN, by embedding C++ code
into the model.
SANs allow to deﬁne custom metrics by means of reward variables. The evaluation
of the reward variables involves specifying a performance (reward) variable and a
reward structure which associates reward rates with state occupancies and reward
impulses with state transitions, namely, a ”reward” is accumulated into a reward
structure every time a set of events of interests take place during the simulation of
the model.
SANs have been used as a modeling formalism in three modeling tools (METASAN
[67], UltraSAN [68], and Mobius [20]), and have been used to evaluate a wide range
of systems.
Multi-formalism approaches
As the system under study grows in complexity and heterogeneity a single mod-
eling formalism reveals almost always inadequate. Current research in the area of
dependability modeling tends to exploit the best from the diﬀerent approaches by
combining them in some hierarchical way. Multi-formalism [69, 70, 71] allows to
adapt the modeling formalism to the nature and level of abstraction of the subsys-
tem to be modeled and provide the modeler with a single cohesive view of the entire
system. Modularity and compositionality ease modeling and also allows for the reuse
of components. Model complexity, is tackled by a heterogeneous combination of
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multi-formalism modeling techniques and related multi-solution analysis. Resorting
to a hierarchical approach brings beneﬁts under several aspects, among which: i)
facilitating the construction of models; ii) speeding up their solution; iii)favoring
scalability; iv) mastering complexity by handling smaller models that hide at one
hierarchical level some modeling details of the lower one.
Examples of applications of multi-formalisms approaches comes from safety analysis.
Safety problems usually requires to account for some critical continuous variables
that exceed acceptable limits. Thus, even if the property called safety is considered
to be an attribute of the dependability, it often requires autonomous and speciﬁc
modeling techniques. Two main modeling approaches have been recently proposed
to deal with hybrid systems, i.e. systems modeled with a multi-formalism approach:
Hybrid Automata and Fluid Petri Nets. Fluid Petri Nets (FPN) [72] are an extension
of standard Petri Nets, where, beyond the places that contain a discrete number of
tokens, a new kind of place is added that contains a continuous quantity(ﬂuid). The
ﬂuid ﬂows along ﬂuid arcs according to an instantaneous ﬂow rate. The discrete
part of the FPN regulates the ﬂow of the ﬂuid through the continuous part, and the
enabling conditions of a transition depend only on the discrete part. Hence, this
extension is suitable to be considered for modeling and analyzing hybrid systems.
2.4 Approaches for Assessing WSNs
Figure 2.1 presents a per year trend growth analysis concerning the number of pub-
lished works on several topics related to WSN. In particular, a number of papers,
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Figure 2.1: Per year trend growth analysis concerning the number of published works on
several WSN topics.
published on various leading IEEE and ACM journals and conference proceedings1
over the last nine years have been considered. The recent scientiﬁc production on
WSNs dependability reliability, assessment and modeling is growing due to the pro-
liferation of critical application scenarios where WSNs are starting to be adopted. In
the last three years, the attention of the community is focusing more and more on
1A Set of considered venues and journals are: IEEE International Conference on Distributed Comput-
ing Systems; IEEE International Conference on Sensor Technologies and Applications; The Sensors Journal;
International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking & Computing; IEEE Transaction on Reliability;
IEEE Transaction on Parallel and Distributed Computing; IEEE Transaction on Wireless Communications;
IEEE Transaction on Computers; IEEE Micro; International Journal of Sensor Networks; IEEE International
conference on Dependable Systems and Networks; International Symposium on Reliable and Distributed Sys-
tems; Journal of parallel and distributed systems; International Conference on Software Engineering, Artiﬁcial
Intelligence, Networking, and Parallel/Distributed Computing; World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia
Networks, 2008; Journal Wireless Networks; International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking;
European Conference on Wireless Sensor Networks; ACM Transaction on Sensor Networks; ACM Confer-
ence on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems Networks; IEEE computer communications; IEEE Journal in
Selected Areas in Communications. International Conference on Parallel Processing.
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i) modeling, showing a 200% of increment in the number of published work (2006 -
2009) , ii) on reliability studies with an increment of the 100% from 2006, of which
73% of the publications are related to evaluation of real-world setups of WSNs, giving
evidence on the dependability threats that can be experienced in practice, and iii)
on fault tolerant solutions (200% of increment from 2006), which are giving more
and more attention to security (about the 80% of the analyzed work of this set). It
is interesting also to note that in the last three years, well established and mature
topics, such as researches on WSN routing shown a decreasing trend in the number
of published work, arriving to be comparable with minor topics such as modeling and
reliability assessment.
Current adopted approaches to evaluate WSN dependability attributes can be cate-
gorized according to two classes: experimental, and model based approaches.
2.4.1 Experimental approaches
Experimental test-beds are used in several works such as [73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78]. One
of the most relevant studies dealing with an experimental test-bed is the Great Duck
Island project [11]. This project focuses on a in-depth study of applying WSN to real-
world habitat monitoring on Great Duck Island (Maine, USA). The paper provides
important analysis regarding the experimental evaluation of node failure cumulative
probability, demonstrating that, in harsh environment, the 50% of the nodes becomes
unavailable within only four days out of three months of the deployment.
Experimental setup of WSNs is thus useful to gain insight in the actual failure be-
havior of WSNs, and to come up with proper failure mode assumptions. However,
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results are diﬃcult to reproduce and are too speciﬁc for the given application scenario.
Hence, they can hardly been used to validate design choices through dependability
assessment at development time.
For this reason, recent research studies on WSNs adopt either analytical or simulative
approaches to validate proposed solutions and anticipate deployment choices at design
and development time.
In [77] a prototype WSN composed of 27 Crossbow Mica2 motes [23] is deployed
in a real coal mine. System errors, detection latency, packet loss rate, and network
bandwidth were measured. Based on the collected data, authors conducted a large-
scale simulation to evaluate the system scalability and reliability.
In [78] authors claim that i) despite software algorithms can be tested through sim-
ulations and syntax checking, it is diﬃcult to predict or test for problems that may
occur once the WSN has been deployed, due to the high complexity of the WSN dy-
namics, and ii) the requirement for testing is not limited at the design phase. Hence,
they propose a framework for in-situ testing and validation which instruments the ﬁ-
nal applications, using the environmental data and stimuli as real input to the testing
and validation process.
2.4.2 Model Based Approaches
The work in [4] faces the design and implementation of a complete running WSN
for surveillance missions, called VigilNet. They show that common reliability as-
sumptions in much current research on WSN, do not hold well in practice, leading
to wrong evaluation of critical parameters, e.g., network lifetime. For instance, they
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found that the packet loss in the MICA2 [23] platform can be as large as 20%.
A number of analytical approaches are presented in [79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86],
which allow to formally express the main characteristics of WSNs in order to assess
their properties. Energetic consumption modeling and lifetime analysis of a WSN
are presented in [79, 80, 87, 88]. In [79] authors provide an analytical model used to
forecast the power consumption and thus the lifetime of the network, only related to
the communication activity. In [80] a network state model is presented to forecast the
network residual energy. In [87] an on-line battery model for estimating the remaining
energy of a node battery in WSNs is presented. In [88] author studied the eﬀect of
using mobile sinks for data gathering in wireless sensors networks, to mitigate energy
holes issues in proximity of ﬁxed sink nodes. All the work in [80, 87, 88] consider
the network divided in several zones in order to detect those critical due to energetic
aspects.
In each of these work, the lifetime is concerned as dependent both on power con-
sumption and on how many packets have been processed. In [82] authors propose
a generic deﬁnition of sensor network lifetime for use in analytic evaluations as well
as in simulation models. They claim that available deﬁnitions of network lifetime
are unable to reﬂects all the application demands and environmental inﬂuences. The
provided deﬁnition of lifetime is composed in a modular way, enabling the incorpora-
tion of diﬀerent application requirements, such as i) number of alive nodes, ii) time
latency in the delivery process, ii) delivery ratio, iii) connectivity, iv) coverage, and
v) availability. Finally they deﬁne the WSN lifetime as the time in which application
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requirements on i)-v) are fulﬁlled.
The work in [81] focused on reliability and delay measures for a WSN. In this work,
a probabilistic graph is adopted to model the network behavior, associating an op-
erational probability to each node, achieved by means of ﬁeld data analysis on real
sensors. Authors assume that failures are caused by component wear out, power fail-
ures and in some cases by natural catastrophes, and they are randomly distributed
in the network. They showed that evaluating the reliability of an arbitrary WSN
is a #NP-hard problem for arbitrary networks. Then they present two algorithms
in order to compute the reliability, and the expected message delay for arbitrary
networks. Finally authors provide numerical results on the proposed algorithms.
In [86] authors investigate node aging process phenomena. They examine the general
node aging problem by unfolding the energy consumption rate and the failure rate.
To this aim, authors provides for each node a survivor function in terms of a Weibull
distribution. Then, the energy consumption rate in a data gathering tree is pre-
sented with and without data aggregation strategies. It is shown that the node aging
process has a signiﬁcant impact on the connectivity as the hop distance increases.
In particular the simulation process evidences that nodes at ﬁrst hop without data
aggregation consume their energy much faster than the case with aggregation. Thus
the consumption is proven to be dependent on the number of children nodes. The
work ends evidencing that data aggregation scheme enhances the node lifetime and
thus the network reliability.
The work in [84, 85] focus on sensor network where nodes send their data to a sink
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node by using multi-hop transmissions. In in [84] authors develop an analytical to
investigate the trade-oﬀs existing between energy saving and system performance, as
the sensors dynamics in sleep/active mode vary. The proposed model allowed au-
thors to derive several performance metrics, among which the distribution of the data
delivery delay. The work in [84] is one of the ﬁrst work adopting analytical model
speciﬁcally representing the sensor dynamics in sleep/active mode, while taking into
account channel contention and routing issues. However, they assume that the WSN
can be model using Markovian techniques, which may result in overestimated met-
rics. Finally, they do not take into account how the energy consumption and failure
behavior impact on evaluated performance metrics. In [85] the problem of multi-hop
lifetime aware routing is addressed. Authors provide a linear programming model to
compute the minimum cost arborescence for reaching the sink node, preserving the
maximum lifetime of nodes.
All mentioned works show that analytical approaches are suitable to assess non-
functional properties of WSNs, such as lifetime, coverage, reliability, and so on. How-
ever, it has been proven that the analytical evaluation of non-functional properties
of an arbitrary WSN is a NP-hard problem [81]. Similar observation is provided in
[89] in which authors show that maximizing WSN lifetime, while maintaining cov-
erage and connectivity simultaneously, without any sensing or communication range
restrictions. is a NP-hard problem.This is partially due to the potentially unlim-
ited number of deployment choices that can aﬀect WSN applications (e.g., adopted
hardware, routing algorithm, network topology, etc.). In addition, the potential of
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analytical models is also aﬀected by the high level of abstraction that does not al-
low to consider detailed deployment aspects, leading to approximate and unrealistic
results.
Fault/Failure Models
Experimental studies have contributed to the deﬁnition of failure mode assumptions
for WSNs. They provide valuable understanding on how WSNs fail in practice. Fol-
lowing this wave, [90] introduces a taxonomy for WSN faults. A fault is concerned
with respect to inconsistent measurements provided by a sensor, such as measure-
ments oﬀset bias, frozen reading, death of a sensor. The work in [91] classiﬁes hard-
ware components of a sensor node into two groups: i) computation engine, storage
subsystem, power supply infrastructure; ii) sensor and actuators. The latter is as-
sumed to be failure prone due to calibration error, random noise error, and complete
malfunctioning. [92] evaluates energy/reliability trade-oﬀ of multipath schemes, as-
suming two widely diﬀerent failure model: independent and geographically correlated
(patterned failures).
Simulative approaches aims at evaluating WSN fault/failure models are provided
in [93, 94, 91, 95]. In [93] authors evaluate the reliability of the communication
infrastructure of a WSN. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the few work that
does not assume WSN failures randomly or uniformly distributed on the network area.
The paper reports also consideration of common cause failures [96] in the provided
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reliability analysis. A sensor node can fail s-independently2 due to component wear-
out, power failure or depletion, and natural catastrophes according to an exponential
distribution with a rate of λ = 1E − 7 failure per second. The network can fail due
to collision, interference and jamming. However, no assumption on the fault nature
are provided.
In [95] author study the connectivity properties of large-scale wireless sensor networks
and discuss their implicit eﬀect on routing algorithms and network reliability. They
assume a network model of n sensors which are randomly distributed over a ﬁeld. The
sensors may be unreliable with a probability distribution, which possibly depends on
n and the location of sensors. Two active sensor nodes are connected with probability
p e (n) if they are within communication range of each other. Author prove a general
result relating unreliable sensor networks to reliable networks. These results are
shown through graph theoretical derivations and are also veriﬁed through simulations.
The work in [92] evaluates energy/resilience tradeoﬀ of multipath schemes, assuming
two widely diﬀerent failure model: independent and geographically correlated. Au-
thors show that multipath routing (e.g. random walk routing) can preserve WSN
lifetime by means of its path-resiliency. They ﬁnally provide useful insights on the
relationship between the probability of node isolation from the sink, and the path
length. In [97] simulations are used to evaluate the impact of failures and routing pro-
tocols on achievable sensing coverage. They start from the observation that diﬀerent
routing protocols lead to diﬀerent values of achievable sensing coverage when some
2s node can fail due to a common cause.
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nodes are no longer available. Finally authors propose coverage-preserving routing
protocols for randomly distributed WSNs that is shown by simulation to be able to
substantially improve the performance of network sensing coverage, if compared with
the original ones.
In [94] a framework for modeling reliability of data transport protocols in WSN is
presented. Here, faults are categorized in i) communication failures ii) Node failures.
These are further subdivided in accidental damage, sensing devices, energy depletion
and transient failures.
Fault model used in fault detection strategies are presented in [91]. The work in
[91] deﬁnes a network and a fault model. Hardware components of sensor motes
are here divided into two groups: i) computation engine, storage subsystem, power
supply infrastructure; ii) sensor and actuators: these are assumed to be the only
components prone to failure. The assumed faults are only calibration error, random
noise error, and complete malfunctioning. Nodes are assumed to be still capable of
receiving, sending, and processing when they are faulty.
Work that deal both with WSN dependability evaluation and network dynamics are
[98, 99, 100]. In [98] authors give evidence of the network dynamics awareness as
a fundamental concept to evaluate/develop faut tolerant WSN solutions. In [99]
is evidenced the dependency of WSN dependability on the base station position.
In [100] authors make their point on the paramount importance that environment,
sensing hardware and network related aspects have in a pragmatic evaluation of WSN
lifetime, outlining the basic structure for a WSN evaluation framework.
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2.4.3 Discussion
All the analyzed work presented interesting methods and/or techniques which are
agnostic for the target application being used. This is a limiting factor since that
nodes’ lifetime is strictly dependent upon the activities performed by the installed
software applications (e.g., diﬀerent aggregation schemes [101], or diﬀerent compu-
tational loads ). In addition, most of the existing failure models, stem from strong
assumptions on network topology (e.g., random topology, which is most often unre-
alistic) and on power consumption ﬁgures (e.g., inﬁnite energy or ideal battery cells).
Finally each analyzed work deﬁned its own fault model, making it diﬃcult to gener-
alize the results. The lack of a realistic fault model is also due to the fact that the
majority of results (over the 80% of the papers considered in our study) are drawn by
means of rather abstract simulations. Finally, None of the presented works take into
the account the nature and the objective of the considered WSN, i.e. the envisioned
mission.
2.5 Available WSN assessment Frameworks
In this section we analyze the main characteristics of the most adopted WSNs simu-
lation frameworks. Detailed aspects of frameworks are out of the scope of this thesis,
and can be found in the referenced papers. Several simulation engines for WSNs have
been recently proposed. A subset of the most referenced/used simulation/emulation
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of the analyzed simulators
Characteristics
Simulator Routing Propagation Failures Energy Workload Topology
YES Partial YES
SHAWN (programmed in YES (packet loss NO (programmed in YES
C++) & corruptions) C++)
YES Partial YES YES
ALGOSENSIM (described in YES (packet (simple YES (random &
XML) loss) model uniform)
YES Partial YES
NS-2 (choice of 4 YES (packet YES (programmed in YES
algorithms) loss) TCL)
YES Partial YES
GLOMOSIM (choice of several YES (packet NO (programmed as YES
algorithms) loss) modules)
YES Partial YES
J-SIM (choice of several YES (packet YES (programmed in YES
algorithms) loss) TCL)
YES Partial YES
TOSSIM (programmed in YES (packet loss YES (programmed in YES
nesc) & corruptions) nesc)
YES Partial YES
EMSTAR (programmed in YES (packet NO (programmed in YES
nesc) loss) nesc)
YES Partial YES
ATEMU (programmed in YES (packet loss NO (programmed in YES
nesc) & corruptions) nesc)
YES YES
AVRORA (programmed in NO NO YES (programmed in YES
assembly) assembly)
environment of WSNs are reported in Table 2.1 which relates the considered as-
sessment frameworks to the provided capabilities in terms of the possibility to re-
produce/take into account i) routing protocol behavior, ii) medium propagation, ii)
failures, iv) energy consumption, v) workload and vi) customizable topology. Let us
analyze the table by columns.
Examples are TOSSIM [16], Avrora [102], Ns-2 [15], J-SIM [103], Glomosim [104] and
EMstaremstar. TOSSIM [16] is an event-based simulation environment for WSNs
based on the TinyOS operating system [105]. The user can simulate his applications
written with the NesC programming language [106]. The simulator permits to ob-
serve the behavior of nodes, even in terms of energy consumption, under diﬀerent
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conditions in terms of topology and wireless propagation models. TOSSIM simulates
the execution of nesC code on TinyOS/MICA hardware, aims to study the behav-
ior of TinyOS and its applications rather than analyzing the performance of new
protocols.
Avrora is a WSN emulator which helps developing sensor network with clock-cycle
accurate execution of microcontroller programs [102]. Avrora attempts to ﬁnd a
middle ground between TOSSIM and microcontroller emulator, such as ATEMU
[107]. Avrora is implemented in Java, unlike the other two emulators, which are
written in C. Similar to many of the object-oriented simulators, Avrora implements
each node as its own thread. However, it still emulates actual Mica code. Avrora
runs code in an instruction-by-instruction fashion. However, the simulator attempts
to achieve better scalability and speed than TOSSIM by avoiding synchronization of
all nodes after every instruction.
Ns-2 [15] is a discrete event networks simulator that began in 1989 as a variant of
an even earlier network simulator. It is written in a combination of C++ and OTcl,
an object oriented scripting language. Support for wireless networks was added in
1997; it is designed to simulate wireless LAN protocols, though later expanded to
mobile ad-hoc networks. A project at the Naval Research Laboratory produced an
extension to NS-2 for sensor networks [108].
This extension adds a channel module for modeling physical phenomena such as
sensor nodes and the environment. Although NS-2 has been used to evaluate wireless
sensor networks, the accuracy of results are questionable since the MAC protocols,
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packet formats, and energy models are very diﬀerent from those of typical WSN
platforms.
J-Sim (formerly known as JavaSim) is a general purpose Java-based simulation en-
vironment [103] and is based on the ns-2 network simulator. It permits to describe
the WSN in terms of network components and TCL scripts and considers correlated
aspects, such as energy depletion and network topology. It has been built upon
the notion of the autonomous component programming model. The main beneﬁt of
J-Sim is its considerable list of supported protocols, including a WSNs simulation
framework with a very detailed model of sensor networks, and a implementation of
localization, routing and data diﬀusion algorithms. J-Sim provides a GUI library for
animation, tracing and debugging support and a java scripting interface Jacl.
GloMoSim [104] is a simulation environment for wireless and wired network sys-
tems. It employs the parallel discrete-event simulation capability provided by Parsec
(PARSEC: Parallel Simulation Environment for Complex System) which is a C-based
simulation language. GloMoSim source and binary code can be downloaded only by
academic institutions for research purposed. Commercial users must use sQualNet
(sQualnet: A Scalable Simulation Framework for Sensor Networks), which is the
commercial version of GloMoSim. While eﬀective for simulating IP networks, it is
not capable of simulating any other type of network. This eﬀectively ensures that
WSNs cannot be simulated accurately.
EmStar [109] is a software framework to develop WSN applications on 32-bit plat-
forms as Microservers, running Linux, as well as for conventional 8-bit platforms
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running the TinyOS operating system. The EmStar environment contains a Linux
micro kernel extension, libraries, services and tools. The most important tools are:
(1) EmSim: A simulator of the microservers environment where every simulated node
runs an Em-Star stack, and is connected through a simulated radio channel model.
EmSim is not a discrete event but a time-driven simulator, which means that there
is no virtual clock. (2) EmCee: An interface to real low-power radios, instead of
a simulated radio model, obtaining radio emulation. Additionally, the UCLA staﬀ
has developed (3) EmTOS: An extension of EmStar that enables nesC/TinyOS ap-
plications to run in an EmStar framework. OMNeT++ [110] is a public source
component-based discrete event network simulator. The simulator mainly supports
standard wired and wireless IP communication networks, but some extensions for
WSN exist. Like NS-2, OMNeT++ is popular, extensible and actively maintained
by its user community in the Academia who has also produced extensions for WSN
simulation. OMNeT++ uses C++ language for simulation models. Simulation mod-
els (modules) are assembled with high-level language NED into larger components
to represent greater systems. OMNeT++ is capable of running most TinyOS simu-
lations by NesCT application that converts TinyOS source to simulator compatible
C++ code [111].
SENS (Sensor, Environment and Network Simulator) [112], is a platform-independent
and has a modular, layered architecture which is capable of modeling the application,
networking and physical environment. The ability to model physical environments
by deﬁning them as a grid of interchangeable tiles is a core strength of SENS. Three
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modeling implementations with diﬀerent signal propagation characteristics including
concrete, grass and walls are currently available. However, the existing power model
needs an improvement to include a battery model. No details of routing protocols
behavior are available.
Shawn [113] is open source simulator designed to to support large-scale network
simulation. Shanw is a algorithm oriented simulator [5][6] and it provides a support
to the user for writing algorithms to simulate in C++ language. In addition, the
simulator allows to decide simulation characteristics such as topological model (which
can be selected among a set of already available models) and medium propagation
model which can be used to reproduce delivery delay and packet loss.
Similarly to Shawn, Algosensim is a algorithm oriented simulator [114]. Algosensim
provides powerful means for the development of routing and positioning algorithms
for WSN. In addition, Algosensim includes the simulation of sensor nodes hardware
aspects, such as battery discharge process. Mobile scenarios are also envisioned, de-
spite not implemented yet. Packet corruption and loss is simulated and the simulator
allow to select nodes to be considered as failed, but it does not allow to reproduce
the failure behavior by itself.
2.5.1 Discussion
The failure behavior is faced partially, i.e., only with respect to network failures,
such as packet loss and packet corruption (corruptions are modeled only by SHAWN,
TOSSIM, and ATEMU; AVRORA does not model network failures). As for node
failures, only node switch oﬀs (due to battery exhaustion) are simulated, and only
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Figure 2.2: Classiﬁcation of analyzed simulator: the darker the color, the more
extensible the simulator
by a subset of simulators, such as, ALGOSENSIM , NS-2, J-SIM, and AVRORA.
Node failures due to the sensing hardware or to the software running on nodes are
not considered at all.
The energy consumption is an important aspect aﬀecting (and aﬀected by) WSN
applications, network dynamics and routing algorithms. However, several frameworks
do not model this aspect, and other frameworks simplify it. For instance, TOSSIM
estimates the energy consumed by nodes, by means of an energy proﬁle of the software
running on the emulated nodes, but it does not simulate battery exhaustion (WSN
nodes run without interruption during the simulation).
A further qualitative classiﬁcation of a subset of the considered simulator is pro-
vided in Figure 2.2, considering scalability, extendibility and level of abstraction
provided by the considered simulator/emulator environment.
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If compared to analytical approaches, simulative approaches are closer to real WSN
settings, with greater attention to low-level aspects. They allow to reproduce the
expected behavior of every single WSN node on the basis of the real algorithms that
are planned to be run on nodes. Despite this, WSN simulators still miss to consider
several real-world aspects that may aﬀect the results, such as detailed failure models
and their link to network dynamics (e.g., how a failure of a node in the network
aﬀects the behavior of the remaining nodes). In addition, it is not always possible to
express and hence evaluate non-functional properties trough simulative approaches.
In addition, such evaluation would require several simulation runs in order to achieve
results with adequate conﬁdence. This in turn would increase the time needed for the
simulation by order of magnitudes, given the low-level of detail of these approaches.
As another issue, the analyzed frameworks present a not negligible diﬃculty of man-
aging the inter-dependence between all aspects impacting on WSN behavior (routing,
energy, failures, etc.), which is driven by state changes (e.g. topology update due
to failures/recoveries). The deriving complexity has to be explicitly managed by
users. This brings to another limitation: the diﬃculty of use. Users have to program
the workload and the routing algorithm. In some cases, the routing algorithm can
be chosen from a library, but the inclusion of new algorithms (e.g., facing change
management) in the library is not a simple task.
Chapter 3
Resiliency of WSNs
Available deﬁnitions of network resiliency encompassing only the connectivity to the sink or
between nodes, are not enough to characterize the data-driven nature of WSNs. The service
delivered by the WSN does not encompass only the connection, but also the computation,
i.e., even when sensor nodes are potentially connected ( a path exists between nodes and sink
node), data losses can still occur.
This chapter introduces the concept of WSN resiliency as compound non-functional property,
composed of Connection Resiliency and Data Delivery Resiliency, which not interrelated.
Data Delivery Resiliency is deﬁned in this thesis as the persistence of the delivery eﬃciency of
node measurements/computation to the sink, against manifesting changes. Then, it presents
the holistic approach proposed in this thesis for assessing the resiliency of WSNs.
3.1 System Assumptions
The system under study is a wireless sensor network made out of N nodes. Each node
is composed of a processor board, a sensor board equipped with one or more sensors
(e.g., humidity sensor, thermistor, photo resistance, etc.), a radio board enabling the
wireless communication between nodes, and a power supply unit, including batteries.
We assume that initially all nodes have the same characteristics and capabilities.
The network is stationary, i.e., nodes do not move during the WSN lifetime, which
is typical for environmental and structural monitoring applications. The network
includes a higher-level node (usually a laptop or a set-top-box), called “sink” node,
which is responsible of gathering data and of controlling WSN nodes. Sink node
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failures are not considered in this thesis. This is reasonable due to the more reliable
hardware/software equipment a sink is typically made of, if compared to a WSN
node.
The mission of the considered WSN is to gather data from nodes (e.g. envi-
ronmental measurements) and to forward it to the sink node. Typical application
requirements for this types of WSNs are i) to deliver of a given amount (or fraction)
of measurements to the sink node, and ii) to keep a given connectivity degree of the
network, avoiding that signiﬁcant portions (or sub-networks) of the WSN are com-
pletely isolated from the sink. Both the requirements have to be met within a given
time horizon, i.e., the considered mission time.
3.2 WSN Resiliency
Resiliency has been recently deﬁned as the persistence of dependability when facing
”changes”[12]. Changes are related to mutations in the topology, workload, link
quality etc. due to failure/recovery of nodes. For instance, a node failure in a WSN
has the eﬀect of modifying the system topology by the removal of a communication
node and its corresponding links. Since a real WSN conﬁguration is not generally a
fully connected graph, successive failures may result in a disconnection of the system,
namely a disconnection failure, and therefore prevent a set of nodes from reaching
the sink (i.e. isolated nodes). Hence, the concept of connection resiliency is related to
the WSN topology, i.e. the degree of path redundancy in the network. However, the
service delivered by the WSN does not encompass only the connection, but also the
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computation, i.e., even when sensor nodes are potentially connected (a path exists
between nodes and sink node), data losses can still occur.
To overcome this limit, this thesis deﬁnes the concept of data delivery resiliency
and qualiﬁes the concept of WSN resiliency as a non functional properties composed
by both connection resiliency and data delivery resiliency, which are not interrelated.
The concept of data delivery resiliency relates to i) the computational load on
nodes which may causes packet losses due to buﬀer overrun, ii) application require-
ments, e.g. at least a given amount of produced measurements must be delivered to
the sink node iii) routing and MAC protocols impacting on the data delivery features
and packet error rate and iv) radio interferences and packet loss/corruption phenom-
ena on the propagation medium. The variation in the amount of useful data received
by the sink due to disconnection failures that can be tolerated by the WSN depends
on the requirements of the application.
Hence, assessing the data delivery resiliency as well as the connection resiliency is
a crucial if not essential task in designing dependable WSNs, since it could help to i)
anticipate critical choices e.g., concerning node placement, running software, routing
and MAC protocols, ii) mitigate risks, e.g., by forecasting the time when the WSN
will not be able to perform with a suitable level of resiliency, and iii) prevent money
loss, e.g., providing a criteria to plan and schedule maintenance actions eﬀectively.
The idea of complementing connection resiliency with data delivery resiliency
stems from the observation that connection resiliency can be misleading for char-
acterizing the overall resiliency level of a WSNs. Let us discuss this claim with an
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example. Let’s consider a WSN deployed so that the sink node is connected only to
a single node of the WSN, and all the remaining nodes rely on that node for reach-
ing the sink. The network is connected, i.e. every node of the WSN can reach the
sink. However, the only node connected to the sink may experience higher packet
loss and failure rate than other nodes, since the more stressful forwarding activity
it have to face. Hence, the WSN, despite presenting a high connection resiliency (a
high number of nodes fails in the network but not the only node directly connected
to the sink), manifests low level in data delivery resiliency, since measurements pro-
duced by all nodes are funneled to the sink through a single node that, due to the
induced overhead, is not able to accept all incoming packets. This way, not all the
produced data is delivered to the sink. Depending on application requirements this
may lead to a WSN failure or not. For instance, structural health monitoring and
security monitoring applications (See Chapter 1) require all data from every node to
be delivered to the sink node. For structural health monitoring, typically acceleration
samples down to 500μG have to be acquired at a frequency higher than 1KHz and
synchronously at all nodes. Failing in delivering synchronization commands, or data
then an imperfect picture of the monitored structured will be achieved, making anal-
ysis in the best inaccurate. Nevertheless, optimizing the WSN topology is not the
panacea to the mentioned scenario, and the evaluation of only connection resiliency
may anyway produce misleading results.
As a further example, ﬁgure 3.1 anticipates some of the results of Chapter 7,
and in particular it sketches the results we obtain from two hypothetical WSNs,
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Figure 3.1: WSN Resiliency (failure domain) (a) connection resiliency, (b) data de-
livery resiliency
A and B, both of them connected and with same topology (the sink is reachable
through multiple nodes). In this example, the only diﬀerence between the considered
WSN regards the routing algorithm being adopted. A adopts a random walk routing
algorithm (which randomly selects one of the neighboring nodes to forward a packet
to the sink), and B uses a reliable multi-hop routing algorithm (which builds a routing
tree and uses acknowledgments and retransmissions to reduce data losses).
Looking at ﬁgure 3.1.(a), it seems that random routing has a greater capacity
to withstand failures, keeping a higher level of connection resiliency, if compared to
reliable multi-hop routing (this result is conﬁrmed under several diﬀerent network
conditions, in Chapter 7). Random routing is a very light weight protocol, which
better preserves the life of WSN nodes. Hence, at a ﬁrst sight, a developer would be
induced to choose random routing for a given WSN. However, ﬁgure 3.1.(b) shows
that data delivery resiliency of WSN B outperforms WSN A, due to the higher
capacity of reliable multi-hop at delivering a higher amount of useful data to the
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Figure 3.2: Scheme for the deﬁnition of the resiliency of WSNs
sink, even in the presence of failures. Hence, depending on application requirements,
data delivery resiliency add one further element to discriminate between diﬀerent
solutions. Also, results are aﬀected by other factors, such as the workload running
on nodes and the failure rate. This variable factors complicate the evaluation task,
and motivate the need for an holistic approach for resiliency assessment.
3.2.1 Deﬁnitions
Figure 3.2 shows the taxonomy of WSN resiliency proposed in this thesis. We con-
ceive the Resiliency of a WSN as a compound property composed of connection
resiliency and data delivery resiliency. The former is the persistence of the amount
of data delivered to the sink , the latter is the persistence of network connectivity,
both in spite of WSN changes. Data delivery resiliency and connection resiliency can
be estimated in the time domain, i.e. as a function of time, or against the number
of failures manifested in the WSN. Estimating the resiliency in the time domain is
useful to forecast non functional properties (e.g. provided level of dependability) in
order to drive design choices, at design time, or to schedule maintenance actions,
during the operational phase. On the other side, the evaluation of the resiliency
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against manifested failures is of paramount importance to assess the behavior of the
WSN when dealing with fault tolerant routing algorithms, clustering strategies, and
redundant nodes.
The concept of connection resiliency for computer networks and ad-hoc networks
has already been deﬁned in the literature. In particular, we extend the deﬁnition
provided in [13] and deﬁne the probability of disconnection P (n) as follows:
P (n) = Q(n)
n−1∏
j=1
(1−Q(j)) (3.1)
where Q(j) is the probability that after the nth failure, a set of K nodes is isolated
from the sink, given that for n − 1 failures, they are connected. In this work we
assume K = 1 for the sake of simplicity. This does not impact on the quality of
provided results neither on the followed approach. Consistently with data delivery
resiliency, from Equation 3.1, we deﬁne the connection resiliency in the time domain
(Equation 3.2) the longest time interval in which the WSN is able to survive while
preserving a disconnection probability lower or equal to a given threshold. ρ, namely:
∫ t∗∧t∗∈[0,T ]
0
p(t) dt ≤ γ (3.2)
where [0, T ] is the observation interval, t∗ the instant of time : ∀t > t∗ Equation
3.2 is not veriﬁed. p(t) is the probability density function of WSN failures in the
observation interval.
Similarly, we deﬁne the Connection Resiliency with respect to manifested failures, as
the greatest number of failures NF that the WSN can accommodate while preserving
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a disconnection probability lower or equal than a threshold. In other terms:
NF∑
i=1
P (i) ≤ γ (3.3)
In addition to connection resiliency, we deﬁne the concept of data delivery re-
siliency for WSNs. To this aim, we start from the deﬁnition of probability of data
delivery failure to the sink as:
D(k, n) = R(k, n)
n−1∏
j=1
(1−R(k, j)) (3.4)
where R(k, n) is the probability that after the nth failure, a given amount of data (k)
computed by nodes is not received by the sink, given that for n − 1 failures, it was
delivered. More in detail, R(k, n) is deﬁned as:
R(k, n) =
∫ T (n)
T (n−1)
r(k, t|corruptions)dt +
∫ T (n)
T (n−1)
r(k, t|duplications )dt (3.5)
Where i) the ﬁrst term takes into account the delivery probability of a given amount
of data when no corruption caused the discard of the packet (e.g. the MAC layer was
able to correct a bit error or no bit inversion manifested during the transmission),
ii) the second term takes into account the delivery of non duplicated packets, hence
relating to routing protocol eﬃciency. Equation 3.5 relates to the manifested failures
by means of T (n− 1) and T (n). More speciﬁcally, when computing 3.5 with respect
to the number of manifested failures, T (n − 1) is the time when the n − 1th failure
manifested and ΔT (n) is the time interval between the n − 1th and the n − th
failure. When computing 3.5 with respect to time, T (n) is the instant of time of
the n− th evaluation of the Data Delivery resiliency over an observation interval of
T (n)− T (n− 1).
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From Equation 3.5 we deﬁne the data delivery resiliency in the time domain as
the longest time interval [0, t∗]in which the WSN is able to contain data delivery
failures hence delivering an acceptable amount of useful data to the sink, i.e.:
∫ t∗∧t∗
0
d(t) dt ≤ ρ (3.6)
where [0, T ] is the observation interval, t∗ the instant of time : ∀t > t∗ Equation 3.2
is not veriﬁed. Analogously, we deﬁne the data delivery resiliency with respect to
manifested failures, as the greatest number of manifested failures NF that can take
place in the WSN, while preserving an acceptable amount of data delivered to the
sink, i.e. :
NF∑
i=1
D(k, i) ≤ ρ (3.7)
It is worth noting that the provided deﬁnitions of Date Delivery Resiliency relate to
the size of the amount of data delivered to the sink by means of equation 3.4. This
way it is possible to compute the Data Delivery Resiliency with respect to application
requirements, e.g. at least on k computed measurements, a fraction of them must be
correctly received by the sink node.
3.3 Routing issues inﬂuencing WSN Resiliency
It is not the primary aim of this thesis to overview and detail the large spectrum of
existing routing algorithms for WSNs; interested readers could refer to good surveys
in the literature [21, 115]. Rather, in this section we review and classify the main
underlying characteristics, common to several routing solutions, aﬀects the WSN
resiliency. The ﬁrst characteristic we consider is the selection mode of forwarding
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nodes. This is a basic function of each routing algorithm: each sensor node has to
select one (or more) node, among its neighboring nodes, to be used as a forwarder to
the sink node. According to this characteristic, routing algorithms can be classiﬁed
as random or based on a selection function.
Flooding and Gossiping [116] are well-known examples of the ﬁrst class of algo-
rithms, where no selection function is used. Nodes simply forward they packets to
all their neighbors (ﬂooding) or to a random subset of them (gossiping), with the as-
sumption that data will eventually reach the sink. These algorithms are very simple
to implement, but are ineﬃcient in terms of the number of packets actually delivered
to the sink, in a time unit. The second class of algorithms can be broken into several
sub-classes, depending on the selection function. A non-exhaustive list of selection
criteria is reported in the following. For each criterion, we indicate the name gen-
erally used in the literature to refer to the corresponding routing solutions. Clearly,
diﬀerent criteria have a diﬀerent impact on performance metrics. i) Select the neigh-
bor on the path that minimizes the number of hops to reach the sink (ﬂat and/or
hierarchical multi-hop routing); ii) select the neighbor on the path that minimizes
the overall energy to reach the sink (energy-aware routing); iii) select the neighbor
on the path that satisﬁes a set of quality metrics (other than energy), such as delay,
reliability, bandwidth, etc. (QoS-based routing); iv) select the neighbor geographi-
cally closest to the sink (location-based routing); and v) select the neighbor based
on the type of information contained in the packets (data-centric routing). All these
solutions require sensor nodes to maintain a routing table to perform the selection.
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The update of such tables requires extra operation, impacting on performance met-
rics. Hence, the second characteristic to be considered is the routing table update
mode. Without loss of generality, three update modes can be considered: i) reactive
update, i.e., tables are updated upon changes (such as node crashes, residual energy
depletion, etc.), ii) proactive update, e.g., the table is periodically updated, and iii)
application driven update, i.e., tables are computed on-demand, only when required
by applications (this is typical of query-based solutions, often used in conjunction
with data-centric routing).
Another key characteristic is the overhead introduced by routing solutions in
terms of extra packets. For instance, the implementation of a reliable multi-hop
protocol requires acknowledgments packets. Another example is data-centric rout-
ing, such as SPIN (Sensor Protocols for Information via Negotiation) [117]. SPIN
requires to ﬂood advertisement packets (to announce the presence of new data), and
to send back request packets (to command the data transfer and to update routing
tables on demand). The last characteristic we consider is the use of data aggrega-
tion techniques. The main idea of data aggregation is to combine the data coming
from diﬀerent sources en route (in-network aggregation) by minimizing the num-
ber of transmissions, thus prolonging network lifetime. Directed Diﬀusion [118] is a
well-known example of routing algorithm using data aggregation as its foundation.
Chapter 4
Orchestrating Behavioral and
Analytical Simulation: the
Holistic Approach
This chapter presents the holistic approach proposed in this thesis. The objective of the
approach is to evaluate holistically how inter-dependent factors such as workload and failure
behavior interacts, and hence, to assess how the WSN behaves in whole. To this aim, the
approach combines the expressiveness of analytical models with the capability of behavioral
simulators to estimate detailed ﬁgures on the system behavior.
In order to avoid behavioral simulations upon each change manifesting during the simulation
of the failure model, the approach relies on an external component. Such component is here
referred as External Engine and orchestrates the failure model simulation recomputing model
parameters values upon triggered changes. The External Engine decouples analytical models
from change management issues, achieving higher modularity and simplifying the structure of
the failure model, while taking into account all needed details. Moreover, the External Engine
is in charge of generating the analytical model with respect to behavioral simulation results
and user preferences, avoiding a modeling phase performed by the ﬁnal user.
4.1 Holistic Approach for Resiliency Assessment
The proposed approach is depicted in Figure 4.1 and it is organized in 7 steps. In step
1 the user provides the needed inputs to conﬁgure the real WSN scenario in terms of:
i) the number and type of nodes, ii) the network topology, iii) the workload (i.e., the
user application) to be run on each node, iv) the radio communication technology, v)
the adopted routing algorithm, vi) the battery technology for each node, and vii) the
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Figure 4.1: The proposed approach
sensing hardware technology for each node. Inputs from i) to v) are used to setup
the behavioral simulator (we adopted TOSSIM, as motivated in next section). All
the inputs not explicitly considered by the adopted behavioral simulator (vi and vii
in our case) are stored as user preferences.
Step 2 concerns the behavioral simulation of the WSN under study. Simulation
results consists of a set of network parameters which are specialized for the WSN
under study and which will be used by the external engine to feed SAN models
and to handle changes. Examples of computed parameters are the per-node energy
consumption proﬁle, the link-by-link loss probability, and workload characteristics,
such as the duty-cycle (e.g., the average percentage of useful work performed by each
node when woken up), and the average size of sent/received packets.
The automatic generation of analytical models and related metrics (e.g. resiliency)
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is performed in the third step by the Model Generator component of the External
Engine.
The Model Generator produces SAN models starting from a predeﬁned library
of model templates (stored in a knowledge base and developed una tantum by a
domain expert). The number and type of models to be generated depends on user
inputs. For instance, N node models will be generated for a WSN composed of N
nodes. Each node model will be then specialized depending on the topology (which
determines the neighbors of each node), on the hardware platform (which impact
on the failure model of the sensor board), on the energy proﬁle, and so on. Initial
values for model parameters are conﬁgured starting from the results of the behavioral
simulation (e.g., the link loss probability of each link is set depending on the values
computed by the behavioral simulation) and from a set of pre-deﬁned parameters
(e.g., the failure rates of hardware components) which are provided una tantum by
domain experts and stored in the knowledge base.
Step 4 concerns the simulation of generated analytical models by means of a SAN sim-
ulator engine, such as Mobius [20]. To deal with changes, models are programmed to
notify changes to the External Engine (i.e., to the Changes Manager sub-component)
and to react to consequent updates propagated by the engine. The external engine
can be regarded as a supervision entity encapsulating all the coordination functions
(among analytical models) that are generally diﬃcult to express at the same level
of abstraction of models (i.e., through the same modeling formalism). Hence, the
engine is essential to keep models simple, general and re-usable. We can think at
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the external engine as an inter-model interface facility, which is used to generate and
bootstrap the analytical failure model by parsing behavioral simulation logs (i.e.,
containing behavioral simulation results). However, it is not diﬃcult to realize that
some parameters are dynamic over time, i.e., their values need to be dynamically
updated during the simulation, driven by changes. To exemplify let us consider a
case for a node X. Let us assume that, due to a change in the workload behavior,
the node increases the amount of work to be committed. The change is intercepted
by the engine, which processes it and propagates an energy consumption update to
node X model, which adapts itself to the change (the node starts to consume more
energy). To complicate the picture, let us assume that, later in time, a neighboring
node Y starts to send more packets to node X. This change (managed by the en-
gine) results in a further increase of energy consumed by node X. As a result, at a
given point in time, node X stops working, due to battery exhaustion. The failure is
notiﬁed to the engine which re-computes the routing tree (according to the routing
algorithm chosen by the user), and propagates a routing tree update to the models
of all involved nodes.
From the above example, it is clear how the behavior of a single node impacts on
the behavior of the overall network in an unmanageable number of ways. Conversely,
diﬀerent user choices (e.g., on the routing algorithm) inﬂuence the behavior of every
single node. To master this complexity, we use parametric and re-usable models,
which are autonomous and capable of adapting to changes induced by other models.
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During the simulation, resiliency metrics are evaluated and results are ﬁnally deliv-
ered to the user in step 5.
It is worth noting that the proposed approach allows ﬁnal users to work within
their knowledge domain by interacting only with the behavioral WSN simulator and
by providing his preferences as inputs. In other terms, developers interact with
artifacts that are related to their domain, such as number and type of nodes, nodes
placement, the program/algorithm running on each node, and so on. At the end,
they get required resiliency ﬁgures which are the results of the SAN simulation.
Finally, it is important to note that the proposed approach is general enough to be
extended to other classes of systems and to assess other classes of metrics.
4.2 The External Engine
The External Engine (EE) aims at i) automating the generation of SAN failure
models with initial parameters values, and ii) at handling changes on behalf of the
SAN models, computing dynamic parameters values, adapting the behavior of SAN
models to network changes. The EE is composed of two main components, namely
Model Generator and Changes Manager, whose details are provided in the following.
The Changes Manager also includes a set of utility functions, designed to keep SAN
models simple.
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4.2.1 Model Generator
Objectives of the Model Generator component is to reduce the eﬀort a hypothetic
have to face in order to use the proposed approach. More in detail, the Model Gen-
erator component is designed to automate the creation of SAN models, metrics to
be estimated, and experiments to be performed, according to preferences collected
by the user interface during step 1. Hence, the Model Generator component can
be seen as the ”‘interface”’ of the generated model for parametric data: trough this
component, the SAN model can be easily generated and fed with data gathered from
the behavioral simulation and user preferences. It works in two phases: i) genera-
tion of the SAN models, and ii) specialization of the generated models. During i),
information collected by the user interface (see Chapter 5 ) concerning adopted node
and sensing platform, radio chip, batteries and workload, are exploited by the Model
Generation component to select a speciﬁc set of templates from the model template
library, as reported in Figure 4.1. Model templates are skeletons of SAN models, de-
scribed by means of XML ﬁles. They are produced una tantum by a domain expert
they are organized in a way so that all the details that strictly depend on the con-
sidered WSN (e.g. nodes interconnections, parameters), have to be generated once
the behavioral simulation has terminated. For instance, if the model template T
represents the network layer of the WSN, its structure has to be generated according
to the topology considered during the behavioral simulation, i.e. modeling only the
links that actually are present. Hence, if node X is a neighbor of node Y and Z, then
the model of node X will present two distinct output branches toward the model
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of node Y and Z. This way, the Model Generator component greatly reducing the
user modeling eﬀort, giving ﬂexibility to the approach, so that diﬀerent WSN can be
studied without requiring a new modeling phase.
During the phase ii), the Model Generator components populates the generated mod-
els parameters with values reﬂecting the considered WSN. Such values are gathered
from behavioral simulation and from user preferences on metrics and experiments
of interests. For instance, for each of the modeled links, probabilities of packet loss
need to be specialized according to behavioral simulation results. Therefore, at the
end of the specialization phase, a XML description of all of the generated models
is produced. Then, a parser, translates the XML description of models to a format
understandable by the tool chosen for the simulation of SAN models. In the rest of
this thesis, we refer to the Mobius modeling environment [119] to simulate the SAN
model1. In particular, we designed the XML parser to i) translate the XML ﬁles to
the XML format used in Mobius to describe SAN model, metrics and experiments, ii)
to exploit the facilities provided by Mobius for compiling XML descriptions of SAN
models to C++ and executable ﬁles, and iii) to make it possible to visualize the gen-
erated model through the Mobius User Interface. Hence, at the end of the generation
process of SAN models the user may decide to either visualize/modify/simulate the
SAN model within the Mobius environment or to proceed independently, ignoring
implementation details of the generated SAN model. Table 4.1 reports a subset of
the facilities provided by the Model Generator Component.
1Other simulation frameworks may be taken into account by implementing diﬀerent parsers,
without interfering with the proposed approach.
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Table 4.1: Facilities for the automated generation of the model.
4.2.2 Changes Manager
This component is in charge of handling changes that occur during the simulation of
the SAN model. Changes management is needed due to the occurrence of node fail-
ures or reconﬁguration actions which may cause topology changes (e.g. the network
is partitioned due to the failure of a node). Once a topology change has occurred,
it is important to update all parameters coherently, so that the SAN model simu-
lation can compute updated ﬁgures, such as power consumption (and hence nodes
lifetime) due to the diﬀerent traﬃc they have to forward toward the sink. Hence,
after each change in the network topology, the routing three must be re-computed
for each node. This is accomplished by running on the updated topology the routing
algorithm(s), as indicated by the user at step 1 of the proposed approach. To this
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aim, the Changes Manager holds an abstract model of the network layer of the WSN:
a weighted connectivity graph representing the topology of the considered WSN is
built starting from the packet loss matrix (see Chapter 5) stored in the behavioral
simulation logs (step 2 approach in Figure 4.1). A weight on an edge (i,j) in the
graph represents the packet loss probability of the wireless link between nodes i and
j. Then, the change manager build the routing three on the updated topology.
Once the routing three is updated, the Changes Manager allows the SAN model
to update the energy consumption of the running nodes. This is accomplished by
using parameters values about energy consumption, estimated from the behavioral
simulation. For instance, a leaf node X (e.g. a node that is not forwarding packets
to other nodes) after a node failure, may be selected by other nodes as a forwarder
to the sink, due to the updated routing tree. Consequently, node X may experience
a higher energy consumption rate that is dependent to all the packets that now it
forwards to the sink.
The Changes Manager component is implemented as an external library linked to the
SAN model. In particular, the Model Generator instruments the SAN model with
explicit calls to the methods of the Changes Manager. For instance, methods are
invoked during the simulation of the SAN model upon topology changes (e.g. failure
of a node) with the objective of propagating network changes to the graph managed
by the Changes Manager. Using an external library to handle such changes in the
network preserves the generality of the failure model making it possible, for instance,
to simulate diﬀerent routing algorithms, without the need of diﬀerent SAN models.
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A subset of the methods provided by the Changes Manager is shown in Table 4.2.
For instance, upon each failure event, the function Failing (Table 4.2) is invoked
by the SAN model, in order to update the graph of the available nodes held by
the Changes Manager component. Consequently, a running node may be notiﬁed of
the change in the topology after the manifested failure. If the failed node was the
only parent (i.e. the gateway currently used to reach the sink node) of a running
node, then that node is temporary isolated from the sink. To signal this event, the
function propagate_isolation,is invoked by the isolated node with the objective
of propagating this information to all its children nodes (e.g. all the nodes sending
packets through the isolated node). The involved nodes will then select alternative
paths to the sink. Once the new routing tree is computed, and if alternative paths
to the sink are found, the function propagate_reconnect (Table 4.2) is invoked by
the SAN model in order to update the list of online nodes.
Table 4.2: A subset of the facilities provided by the Changes Manager
Chapter 4. Orchestrating Behavioral and Analytical Simulation: the Holistic
Approach 74
Accounting for Routing Behavior
The computeRoutingTable(nodeID) method is invoked to request an update of the
routing table of a node. This is accomplished by implementing this method con-
sistently with the selected routing algorithm. Diﬀerent sub-functions are included
in computeRoutingTable,making it possible to reproduce the behavior of diﬀerent
routing algorithms without changing the SAN model.
More speciﬁcally, the Changes Manager component takes into account only the char-
acteristics of routing algorithms that have a direct impact on the resiliency of the
considered WSN. The ﬁrst characteristic we consider is the selection function of for-
warding nodes. This is a basic function of each routing algorithm: each sensor node
has to select one (or more) nodes, among its neighboring nodes, to be used as a
forwarder to the sink node. According to this characteristic, routing algorithms can
be classiﬁed as random or based on a selection function. The former simply for-
wards they packets to all their neighbors (ﬂooding), to a random subset of them
(gossiping), or to a random neighbor (random path routing) with the assump-
tion that data will eventually reach the sink. The latter selects the neighbor on the
path that minimizes/maximize a cost function (e.g. quality of traversed links, overall
energy to reach the sink, QoS-based routing ). For instance, concerning a multi-hop
routing algorithm, a function is computed maximizing the quality of the overall path
to be traversed to reach the sink from each node.
The last characteristic we consider is the use of acknowledgments and data aggre-
gation techniques. The ﬁrst are used to signal to the sending node that the recipient
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node received the packet, hence providing a feed-back for reliable transmissions. The
latter consists in waiting a speciﬁc interval of time before forwarding a packet, so to
combine diﬀerent packets coming from diﬀerent sources en route, hence reducing the
number of transmissions and increasing network lifetime. As will be later described
in Chapter 6, we take into account data aggregation and acknowledgments in the
routing SAN model.
It is worth noting that the approach pursued in the design of the change manager
component enables the simulation of a large number of routing algorithms by re-
placing graph weights, node selection function or both, without any change to the
structure of the SAN model. For instance, it is possible to simulate energy aware
routing algorithms by replacing multi-hop graph weights with ﬁgures related to the
remaining energy available on nodes, and by implementing a routing function ﬁnding
paths from all nodes to the sink maximizing WSN lifetime.
4.2.3 Utility functions
The EE includes a set of utility functions used to simplify the structure of SAN
models. For instance, a set of functions is included to manage packets, including
their structure (e.g., the sender and receiver, the time to live ﬁeld, the signature).
This is useful to evaluate the number of useful (i.e., not duplicated) packets reaching
the sink. Another set of functions is used to handle acknowledgment packets (only
when needed, e.g., required for a given routing algorithms, such as reliable multi-
hop). In particular, the EE implements a linked list for each node in the network
for storing the packets sent by a node and waiting for an acknowledgement. Packets
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in the list can be thus re-sent if an acknowledgement is not received within a given
timeout.
4.3 User interface
The use of an interface makes possible to decrease the semantic gap between the WSN
and the model used to assess the resilience, allowing potential users to interacts with
artifacts that are closer to their domain, such as behavioral simulators.
The user interface is used to collect static information which is not computed by the
behavioral simulator, such as node position, the adopted hardware platform (sensing
hardware and micro-controller), battery technology (e.g. lithium ions or nickel metal
hydrate) and the software to be run on nodes. In addition, the interface allows to
explicitly specify intervals of variation for some parameters (e.g., intervals for the
workload duty cycle, the packet size, the number and type of routing algorithms) in
order to ease the conduction of sensitivity analysis studies.
Chapter 5
Behavioral Models
In the presented approoach, a behavioral model is exploited to conﬁgure the WSNs in terms of
hardware platform, topology, routing and MAC protocols, and to study the nominal behavior
of the software, included the OS, and the power consumption of the nodes. Evaluations
performed with the behavioral models are used to gather values for failure model parameters
of the WSN under study, such as the packet forwarding rate of each node. This Chapter
presents the considered behavioral model and how it is realized in the TOSSIM simulator.
5.1 Requirements and Rationale
The objective of the behavioral simulation is to evaluate the parameters needed by the
external engine to specialize the SAN model, during steps 3 and 4 of the approach
(see Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4). Three classes of parameters are evaluated: i) the
energy consumption proﬁle of each node, ii) the loss probability of each link, and iii)
the workload characteristics of each node. These parameters are crucial to initialize
and drive the SAN model simulation. To exemplify, when a packet transmission
event is triggered for node X during the SAN simulation, the SAN model has to
drain an amount of energy from the battery of node X, which depends on the energy
consumption of the radio board and on the packet size. Then, the SAN model
will either simulate a packet delivery or a packet loss depending on the link loss
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Table 5.1: Behavioral model parameters needed by the SAN models
probability. On the other hand, the number of packets transmission events triggered
for each node varies over time, and depends on the current conﬁguration of the WSN
(e.g., number of failed and isolated nodes, network topology, routing tree) which is
updated by the Change Manager during the simulation.
Such parameters can be static or dynamic, and are summarized in Table 5.1.
Static parameters are related to aspects that do not mutate during the simulation of
the SAN model, such as the hardware platform, the battery technology, and the radio
communication technology. Dynamic parameters depend on the current conﬁguration
of the WSN (e.g. number of failed nodes, number of isolated nodes, transmission rate
of each link) and need to be re-computed in the face of every change triggered during
SAN model simulation. The change manager component (step 4 Figure 4.1 ) is in
charge of computing updated values for dynamic SAN model parameters, avoiding a
behavioral simulation upon each manifested change.
The evaluation of model parameters is based on a behavioral simulator able to
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i) simulate or emulate commercial hardware (e.g. commercial sensor boards, micro-
controllers), ii) to mimic the behavior of running applications with a good level of
details, and iii) be extended with custom facilities in order to be integrated within
the proposed approach.
As reported in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.5), a number of the most cited/used en-
vironments for the simulation of WSNs have been analyzed. The performed analysis
shows that the TOSSIM simulator [105] provides a convenient trade-oﬀ between the
level of details and extensibility. TOSSIM provides a set of facilities that make it pos-
sible to emulate real node hardware and to simulate WSN applications (programmed
in NesC [106] and running on TinyOS) with a realistic level of details. We also ex-
tended TOSSIM with facilities to collect user preferences on the considered WSN
by means of a customized user interface, used in step 2 of the approach depicted in
Figure 4.1.
More details on parameters evaluation and on the user interface are provided in
the following.
5.2 Energy Consumption Model
We consider the overall energy consumption of a generic node as the sum of three
main components, namely: energy needed for sensing, for computing and for send-
ing/receiving packets. More speciﬁcally, the energy needed for sensing is dependent
on the adopted sensing platform. Information about energy needs of sensors is gath-
ered from data-sheets. The energy needed for computing activity is dependent on
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the running software and on the workload duty-cycle. Finally, the aliquot of energy
spent for managing packets depends on i) type of radio chip used and programmed
transmissive level of power, ii) length of packets in bytes, iii) packet loss rate, iv)
topology (e.g. per node incoming and outgoing links).
We instrumented TOSSIM simulation engine in order to proﬁle the energy con-
sumption of node subsystems. In particular, we hijack simulation events from the
TOSSIM simulation engine that are responsible for the energy consumption, consider-
ing i) cpu power transition (sleep to active and vice-versa), ii) radio events (reception
and sending of packets), iii) application events, and iv) hardware events (e.g. sens-
ing hardware events). Each time one of the mentioned events take place, an overall
energy consumption ﬁgure is computed as the sum of all the energy requests taking
place in that instant of time. In turn, such ﬁgures are periodically averaged on a
speciﬁc interval of time, obtaining, for each considered subsystem of the node an en-
ergy consumption rate. This computation is performed during the whole behavioral
simulation that is forced to terminate when the computed ﬁgures reach an interval
of conﬁdence of 95%. At the end of the behavioral simulation, values for energy
consumption parameters are stored to a set of simulation logs that are later used by
the model generator and Changes Manager component shown in Figure 4.1.
5.3 Radio Model
We collect this information in a matrix where the element aij is the packet loss
probability on the link between node i and node j. Such a matrix is stored in the
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simulation logs available to the model generator component, depicted in Figure 4.1.
In order to evaluate packet loss ﬁgures of WSN links, it is necessary to adopt an
accurate mathematical model for radio propagation. We extended TOSSIM simulator
by integrating a well know model for the estimation of the node-by-node Received
Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) [120] in its radio modeling facilities. More in detail,
we use information on nodes mutual distances, speciﬁed in the user interface, to
evaluate the RSSI from a node to all the others by means of the following equation1.
Rxpow = Txpow + Txgain − Txloss − FSL−Xσ + Rxgain −Rxloss (5.1)
where:
FSL = −27.55dbm + 20log10(FreqMHZ) + n ∗ 20log10(dm) (5.2)
• FSL is the free space loss factor, expressed in dBm (decibel milliwatt) .
• dm = is the transmissive distance between the source and the destination ex-
pressed in meters
• Txpow, Txgain Txloss are the transmissive power, antennas gain and transmis-
sion losses factors, respectively, all expressed in dBm;
• Rxpow, Rxgain Rxloss are the reception power, antennas gain and reception
losses factors, respectively, all expressed in dBm;
• Xσ is a random variable modeling environmental reverb, e.g. multipath, fading;
1Further details on the propagation model may be found in [121]
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• n is the path loss exponent depending on the environment and on the node
deployment.
Values for Txpow, Txgain, Txloss, Rxgain, Rxloss are gathered from the data-sheet
of the radio chip selected by the user for the simulation. Xσ and n are selected
depending on the user preferences on the nodes deployment (e.g. indoor or outdoor).
After computing Equation 5.1 for each node, we ﬁgure out about the lower bound
of the RSSI after that there is a bit inversion in the transmission. Finally depend-
ing on the packet length and adopted MAC protocols2, we achieve the relationship
between bit error rate and packet loss.
5.4 Workload model
The periodic workload models a typical monitoring sensor network in which readings
are generated at ﬁxed time intervals. Deployments exhibiting this traﬃc pattern
are quite common in practice [122, 123, 11]. In this workload, each sensor sources
traﬃc at some oﬀered load, and helps to forward other sensors’ traﬃc to a sink.
Depending on the amount of data gathered from sensors, on the number of computed
samples, and on the local performed computation, one or more packets of a given
size are produced periodically. Data may be also stored in the local non volatile
memory for being sent later. Hence, we opted to model such a type of workload
by considering the following parameters: i) application duty-cycle, i.e., the time
interval of the application, ii) the average size of generated packets, iii) the total time
2Information collected by the user interface.
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spent in local computation, iv) the application packet generation rate, v) the time
spent in idle state by the application, e.g. while waiting for data being sampled by
sensors. Similarly to energy consumption evaluation, these parameters are computed
by intercepting TOSSIM events responsible of i) cpu power transition, ii) radio events,
and iii) application events [16].
Chapter 6
WSN Failure Model
In this chapter we model the failure behavior of a Wireless Sensor Network by relating single
contribution of a node failure to the entire topology of the network, including the routing
algorithm being used. The model is parametric in the sense that its parameters are taken
by ﬁeld measurement campaigns and/or by external simulative tools. We adopt a two-steps
modeling approach. First, we perform a classiﬁcation of failures as they have been observed on
actual WSNs and as they have been indicated in the existing literature. In particular, failures
are classiﬁed according to Failure Mode and Eﬀect Analysis (FMEA), i.e., from functional
components, down to failure modes and possible causes, as better detailed in section 6.1.
Second, starting from the conducted FMEA, we infer a detailed failure model, according to
a bottom-up approach: a detailed SAN model is built for each of the classiﬁed failure mode,
then the models are combined to form the failure model of a single sensor node, and ﬁnally
the failure model of the overall network).
6.1 Failures and Failure Modes Assumptions
In this section the results of the FMEA is presented. The most frequent failure
occurrences have been derived from past experiences on real testbed prototypes and
from the existing literature, trying to relate failure occurrences with potential causes
(faults). The use of a FMEA makes it possible to evidence the Critical Item List
(CIL) of the network. Each CIL element represents a critical component/function:
a failure of one of these components hardly impacts on system dependability. Thus,
CIL information can be used i) to drive the implementation of the failure model
(FM), and ii) to provide failure mode assumptions that reﬂects real world.
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The following high-level assumptions have been made when performing the FMEA
and when building the model:
1. Each node is composed by a processor board, a sensor board with one or more
sensors (e.g. temperature, humidity etc.), a radio board, and a set of batteries.
2. Initially all the nodes have the same capabilities and characteristics and are
stationary.
3. Sink node failures are not considered. This is reasonable since a sink is typically
realized with more reliable hardware/software equipment (e.g., laptop or a linux
embedded device).
In this thesis, both single wireless node and whole network failure modes are en-
compassed. Failures due to physical damage of nodes (e.g. physical crashes due to
accidents or very adverse weather conditions), malicious activities (e.g. manual, and
unexpected, node withdrawal or substitution), and security threats are excluded.
FMEA results are summarized in Table 6.1: six components/functions have been
identiﬁed for the node: the sensor board, the power supply unit, the radio board,
the communication function, the CPU, and the operating system. For each compo-
nent/function of a node or of the overall network, failure modes, potential eﬀects and
possible causes are reported.
6.1.1 Node failures.
From the prospective the mission of the WSN, a node is failed when i) it is no longer
able to deliver its measurements to the sink, and ii) it is not longer able to provide
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Table 6.1: FMEA results.
meaningful measurements. This can be due the malfunction of one of the components
of the node, as detailed in the following.
Sensor Board : we assume the sensor board can fail according to four failure modes:
stuck-at-zero, null reading, out-of-scale reading, and stuck-at-N. A stuck-at-zero of the
sensor board produces the eﬀect of a out-of-order device, which does not deliver any
outputs to external inputs. Potential causes lay into faults of the sensing hardware
(e.g., as can be observed in [124], the humidity sensor produces a short circuit,
causing a high current drain which turns oﬀ the overall node). Potential causes lay
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into faults of the sensing hardware (e.g., as can be observed in [124], the humidity
sensor produces a short circuit, causing a high current drain which turns oﬀ the
overall node).
Null readings cause the sensor to deliver null output values, for a certain interval of
time. This may be caused by temporary short circuits that also cause the node to
drain excessive power from batteries, hence shortening the overall lifetime of the node
[124]. Out-of-scale readings and stuck-at-N cause the sensor board to respectively
provide no meaningful outputs and frozen readings, for a certain interval of time.
These failures may be due to faults of the analog-to-digital converter or due to error
in the sensing device ﬁrmware.
Power Supply : the power supply component may exhibit stuck-at-zero as well as
reset failure modes (i.e., the node shutdowns and restarts itself). The former is due
to battery energy exhaustion. The latter can be caused by anomalous power requests
that cannot be supplied by batteries, e.g. the residual charge is not suﬃcient to
provide the required amount of power.
Radio Board : it can exhibit packet losses, i.e., the radio packet is not delivered to its
intended destination for instance due to packet corruption.
Communication: the communication function can be compromised by so-called iso-
lation failures: a well behaving node X, which does not fail itself, can manifest an
isolation failure when it is no longer connected to the sink node. This is due to the
failure of all the nodes which act as forwarders for the node X.
It is important to note that the characteristics of all considered node failures depend
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on the network conﬁguration. For instance, the isolation failure strictly depends
on the actual network topology, whereas sensor board failure rates depend on the
adopted hardware, and battery failures on the running software and routing algo-
rithm.
6.1.2 Network Failures.
At the network level, we encompass two failure modes, which are consistent to the
mission of the WSN and to deﬁned requirements: coverage failures, data delivery
failure and disconnection failure. Coverage failures occur when the number of nodes
in a speciﬁc area of the network drops below a given threshold. Data delivery failures
occur when the network is not able to deliver the required amount of measurements
to the sink. Disconnection failures occur when all the nodes belonging to a cut set
of the network fail. As a result, the network is partitioned into two or more isolated
sub-networks. In both cases, the number of failures that can be tolerated strictly
depend on the application requirements.
6.2 WSN Failure Model
Starting from the classiﬁcation obtained with the FMEA, we deﬁne a the WSN failure
model which reproduces the failing behavior of WSNs and sensor nodes. We build the
model according to a bottom-up approach: for each identiﬁed component/function
of a node, we deﬁned a detailed failure model (FM), adopting the Stochastic Ac-
tivity Networks (SANs) formalism. The failure model of a single node is achieved
as interconnection of atomic models. The interconnection of the failure models of
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Figure 6.1: Overall WSN failure model
all the nodes determine in turn the failure model of the overall WSN, which also
embodies network failures (e.g., coverage and net partition), and network dynamics
(e.g., current network topology, traﬃc and computational load). The model is then
solved by means of simulation, using the MOBIUS tool.
The structure of the proposed model is shown in Figure 6.1 in terms of a UML class
diagram. Each class in the lower part of the diagram corresponds to the SAN failure
model of the component/function deﬁned by the FMEA. We can thus ﬁnd the sensor
board, the power supply, the routing and the communication function. The sensor
board FM encompasses all the hardware-related failures of the sensor board. The
Chapter 6. WSN Failure Model 90
power supply FM reproduces the battery discharge process, taking into account stuck-
at-zero and reset. The routing FM reproduces the transmission/reception/forwarding
activity of the node, reproducing the behavior of a speciﬁc routing algorithm (selected
by the user) and the eﬀects of packet losses. The communication FM takes into the
account isolation failures.
Note that we opted to not consider CPU and OS failures. CPU failures are neglected
since the mean time to failure (MTTF) of micro-controllers is greater by orders of
magnitude than the MTTF of other components1. As for the OS, we assume the
bug incidence to be usually low with respect to other failure dynamics, due to the
extreme simplicity and reduced size of node operating systems [105].
As shown in Figure 6.1, the failure model of a single node is composed of the above
mentioned failure models. The network level failure class embodies the failure model
of the network component, i.e., coverage, data delivery and disconnection failures,
depending on the information provided by the routing and communication failure
model. A coverage failure is indeed strictly related to the communication state of all
the nodes. The failure model of the overall WSN is then obtained as the composition
of n single node failure models and of the network level failure model, where n is the
total number of nodes.
It is wort noting that the External Engine interacts with the whole WSN model by
means of the ChangesManager interface, which is used by single node models as well
as by the routing models. As will discussed in Section 6.3.2, the routing model exploit
1According to manufacturers, typical order of magnitude for a micro-controller MTTF is around
ten thousand hours.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.2: (a) SAN model of the overall network; (b) SAN model of a single node.
the facilities of the Changes Manager and of the External Engine to reproduce the
behavior of the routing protocol being simulated. The ChangesManager interface is
also dependent on the Model Generator component, since it is generated jointly with
the SAN Failure model, depending on the speciﬁc modeling framework being used
(See Chapter 4). Following sections will provide example on the interactions between
the model and the External Engine.
Figure 6.2.(a) and (b) shows the compositional schema of the WSN and single node
failure mode generated for a hypothetical WSN composed of 9 sensor nodes and 1
sink node. Both schemes are automatically generated at the end of step 2 (see section
4.1) as a set of MOBIUS XML descriptors. The number and, as will be detailed in
Section 6.3.2, the interconnections of single node models are generated according to
the topology provided by the user for the behavioral simulation.Single node models
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are interconnected to each other (via the join operator - realizing the WSN model
- and the use of places with are shared2 between linked models) according to the
topology of the WSN to simulate.
The models are composed accordingly to the items in ﬁgure 6.1. In addition, a node
coordinator model, called nodeState (see Figure 6.2.(b)) is added to coordinate single
node sub-models.
The proposed model has been validated adopting a trace validation approach [125],
i.e., the behavior of diﬀerent types of speciﬁc entities in the model is traced to de-
termine if the model logic is correct. To accomplish this task, we used the Tra-
viando framework [126], a software tool capable of analyzing and visualizing simu-
lation traces. In particular, by means of Traviando we validated the causal order of
events, assuring that the model was behaving like expected.
6.2.1 The Network Failure Model
The Network FM, shown in Figure 6.3 model is in charge modeling coverage, data
delivery and disconnection failures. To this aim, the Network Failure model holds
information on the number of working nodes in the WSN by means of the shared
place running nodes Each time a failure of a node takes place, a token is moved from
the place running nodes to the place number of failed nodes. Upon this transition,
the input gate areaCoverage invokes a method of the Changes Manager (see section
4.2.2) to test if the density of running nodes is still able to produce an amount
2In the SAN terminology, a model can provide an “interface“ to other models by sharing places
with other sub-models by means of the join operator.
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of data compatible with the WSN mission. For instance, it may happen that due
to disconnection failures, a subset of the WSN is isolated from the sink. Hence,
at the sink, the area monitored by the disconnected set of nodes is not producing
measurements. In this case, despite the remaining nodes are working correctly, a data
delivery failure manifests due to a coverage failure. The Changes Manager allow also
to specify for each node, the area where it is deployed, hence enabling the evaluation
of the density of nodes, area by area.
Figure 6.3: The network SAN mode
Disconnection failures are modeled by the Network Failure model upon each man-
ifesting failure, by means of the methods provided by the change manager. Such
methods permits to evaluate if, eliminating the failed node by the current topology,
other nodes than it result isolated. In this case, a Disconnection failure is triggered
and a token is moved in the place disconnection failure.
Upon a node recovery (signaled by the shared place A node recovering) a place
is moved from number of failed nodes to the place running nodes by means of the
Chapter 6. WSN Failure Model 94
action recovering. In this case, if the former failure caused a data delivery failure,
after a recovery the input gate Coverage granted evaluate if the new conﬁguration of
the network is able to fulﬁll application requirements on the area coverage and on
the data to produce. If this condition is met, then a token is moved out from the
place coverage failure by enabling the action coverage recovery.
6.3 Single Node Model
The single node model, which Mobius scheme is shown in Figure 6.2.(b) is composed
by a failure model (referred as failure model node), a routing model and a node
state model (referred as nodeState). Consistently with the assumptions provided
in Section 3.1, the failure model is composed by i) the sensor board failure model,
which encompasses all the hardware-related failures of the sensor board (e.g., stuck-
at-zero, null reading, etc.), ii) the power supply failure model, which reproduces
the battery discharge process, taking into account stuck-at-zero and reset, and iii)
the communication failure model, modeling isolation failures. This last model is of
particular importance to measure the connection resiliency.
The routing model describes the packet generation and delivery process of the node,
according to the proﬁled workload and the chosen routing algorithm respectively,
taking into account packet loss. Modeling the packet generation and delivery process
is fundamental to measure the data delivery resiliency as a function of both simulated
failures and simulated time.
The failures triggered by failure models are used to update the overall state of the
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single node in the nodeState model (i.e., the node is up, it is temporary failed, it is
permanently failed, or it is isolated). It is worth noting that all node sub-models are
correlated to each other, since a failure triggered in a sub-model can in turn aﬀect
another sub-model. For instance, a null reading of a sensor (sensor board failure
model) can cause an excessive drain of power, hence shortening the life of the sensor
(power supply failure model).
In the MOBIUS tool, SAN models and their compositions are represented by means of
XML descriptors. The Model Generator component of the External Engine generates
the descriptors and populate them with proper parameters values (e.g., link-by-link
loss rate) according both to the results of the behavioral simulation and to user
preferences.
6.3.1 The Node State Model
Node state model accomplish to two main tasks:
1. “start” (boot) of the whole single node model;
2. collection of detailed information from every sub-model, modeling the global
state of the node;
The objective of the ﬁrst task is to initialize the data structure used by the single
node model and containing all the information achieved from the behavioral simulator
by means of the External Engine (see Chapter 5). The timed action gettingParam-
eters is used for this task and a Normal timing distribution is used to avoid false
synchronization between the boot of diﬀerent nodes. The place running enable the
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single node model. All the events (e.g. battery exhaustion) which makes the token
be moved out from the place running cause the total stop of the node model.
Figure 6.4: sub-model node state
The objective of the second task is to collect and propagate information on the state of
the node sub-systems. The model node state depends on and manages all the other
node sub-models. It can be seen as an event bus that transmits events generated
from a component to all the other components which manifested the interest in
such information. To this aim,node state model interface, shown in Table. 6.2, is
exploited by other models upon every failure or recovery event. The places used as
input parameters of the interface are in charge of collecting the state of node sub-
models (e.g. a failure triggered by a sub-model) in order to update the node state.
The output parameters of the interface are used from node state to rise events on
the sub-models, such as to align the mark of the running place shared with all other
models, e.g., after a failure.
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The places Num sensors and num of motes represent respectively the number of the
sensors on the node still operating.
Table 6.2: NodeState model interface
6.3.2 Routing Failure Model
Figure 6.5 reports the SAN model in charge of modeling the packet generation and
delivery process of a single node. The model reported in the Figure 6.5 is related to
an exemplary node X with three neighbors (nodes 2, 9, and 10 in the example, as
reported in Figure 6.6), and it is divided in 5 zones, each of them responsible for a
speciﬁc task.
Zone 1 is in charge managing packet loss ratio parameters for each link between node
X and its neighbors (places sendY loss in Figure 6.5, zone 1, where Y is the ID of
the neighboring node). It also manage radio energy consumption parameters for each
sent or received bit (places radioConsPerReceivedBit, radioConsPerSentBit), and the
initial energy of batteries (place battery charge status, shared with the power supply
failure model). Speciﬁc values for the parameters are gathered from the results of
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.5: SAN of the Routing model.
the behavioral simulation.
Zone 2 models the reception of packets from other nodes. A packet is received when a
token is placed in the place Incoming. The received packet can be discarded if its TTL
is zero, by means of the action discard, otherwise the packet is made available and
processed (places packetAvaliable and processing in Zone 5). In both the cases, when
a packet is received, a quantity of energy is subtracted from the battery charge status
place, depending on the adopted radio chip (in terms of energy per received bit) and
on the packet size.
Items included in Zone 3 model the packets generation process. The timed action
sendOwn, models the duty-cycle proﬁled during the behavioral simulation. Once that
the sendOwn activity ﬁres, a packet of given length is generated through the utility
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Figure 6.6: Topology considered in Figure 6.5. Labels of edges represent the places used in
the model.
functions of the Changes Manager (see Chapter 5) and stored in the place Own. At
the same time, a token ﬂows from the place generating to the places packetAvailable
and processing.
Zone 4 is in charge of reproducing the acknowledgment mechanism, if employed in
the simulated routing algorithm. This includes the retransmission of missing packets.
The modeling is simpliﬁed by the use of the Changes Manager, which implements a
linked list for each node, storing the packets waiting for an acknowledgment. Figure
6.7 shows the portion of code of the Routing output gate responsible for managing
acknowledgments, acting on the list, providing an example of interaction with the
Changes Manager component.
All the items in Zone 5 of Figure 6.5 are used to model the routing of received or
generated packets. The output gate routing is in charge of modeling the selection
of the destination node for the packet stored in the processing place. Figure 6.5.(b)
reports the code used for this task, providing a further example of the interaction
between the SAN model and the Changes Manager. Depending on the routing al-
gorithm being simulated, the output gate routing invokes a speciﬁc parent selection
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Figure 6.7: Output gate routing : extract of the code responsible for managing ac-
knowledgements
function of the Changes Manager to select the destination node. If the algorithm
employs a routing tree (e.g., multi-hop routing), the gate will select only one parent,
e.g., the node 10, from its neighbor list by means of the method getParent() of the
Changes Manager. Then, a token is inserted in the sending10 place, reproducing the
sending of the packet toward node 10. On the other hand, if a ﬂooding (or gossip-
ing) algorithm is being simulated, a broadcast is simulated and a token is inserted
in all (or a subset) of the places of the neighbor nodes. The IDs of the neighbor-
ing nodes are gathered by the method AmIconnectedTo(). The code responsible for
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the forwarding is generated automatically by the Model Generator component of the
External Engine, as highlighted in Figure 6.5.(b).
When a token reaches one of the sendingY places (where Y represents the ID of
the destination node), the packet is forwarded to the speciﬁc node by means of the
corresponding sendY activity and the routeY output gate. All sendY activities are
characterized by cases, used to model packet losses. A packet is lost or forwarded,
depending on the loss rates contained in the sendY loss places (Zone 1). When a
packet is sent, a speciﬁc quantity of energy is drawn from the batteries, depending
on i) the current settings of the radio hardware of the node (e.g. transmissive power,
gathered from behavioral simulation ), and ii) the packet size. After updating the
remaining energy (place battery charge status) the packet is transferred to the cor-
responding place OutgoingY. A token is placed also into the shared place outgoingY
to signal to the destination node that a new packet is available. Such shared places
represent the model interface towards the models of neighboring nodes. In particular,
the outgoingY place is shared with the incoming place of the Routing model of node
Y.
It is worth noting that the routing model represents a good example of model tem-
plate. It is clear that the number and the names of all the items present in Zones 1
and 5 of Figure 6.5 strictly depend on the topology of the network. Hence they need
to be generated by the Model Generator (places, gates, C++ code, and activities)
consistently to the results of the behavioral simulation and to user preferences. For
instance, in the case node X had another neighbor node, node 5, then the routing
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model of node X would have been generated with another output branch linked to
the route output gate, and ending in the places outgoing5, and Outgoing5.
6.3.3 Power Supply Failure Model
The maximum temporal horizon of life for a node of a WSN is determined from the
time-to-failure of its batteries.
The behavioral description of batteries is a complex problem because of the non-
linearity between the voltage and remaining charge. This non linearity is strongly
emphasized especially when the discharge current is not constant (as it happens for
a node of a WSN). For an ideal generator of voltage, the voltage V(t) of the battery
is constant on all the period of discharge and is equals to Voc (open circuit voltage )
until the energy of the batteries is exhausted; after this point, a discontinuity in the
voltage to the terminals of the batteries is generated, making the voltage drop from
Vcutoff 3 to zero.
An other factor that generates not-linearity in the characteristic of discharge of the
battery is the charge ”recovery eﬀect”. This eﬀect is due to transient current re-
quests: a rapid current request causes the depletion of the electrical charges from
the electrode, with a consequent drop in the voltage. If the request is massive, then
the voltage may drop below the Vcutoff , causing the temporary unavailability of the
batteries, and hence a temporary shutdown of the node. Nevertheless, after a given
amount of time, the charge will again move from the electrolyte to the electrode,
3It is the voltage in which the battery does not succeed to distribute current on any load, included
its inner resistance
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thus, making the node again available. This eﬀect is closely dependent on the nature
of the battery, and for lithium battery it can be neglected.
In WSN nodes, batteries are not directly connected to the load: a so called DC-DC
converted is usually used to stabilize the voltage to the clamps of the load, but at
the price of a reduced overall life of the device due to conversion ineﬃciencies4.
Mathematical model
In this thesis, power supply stage is assumed to be composed by batteries and by the
DC-DC converter ,in a unique black-box, so that the voltage of the batteries can be
considered constant in the interval (Voc, Vcutoff−dc).
In this model the battery is considered as a ”tank” of known capacity, from which
it is possible to drain energy. The maximum capacity of the battery is assumed to
be constant, without considering the eﬀects capacity lessening due to the current
request: this choice is reasonable due to the negligible current absorption for the
nodes (about 5-15 mA). The energy supplied by the batteries, represents a starting
point in the model and it is calculated as follows:
Ebatt = Vcc · 3600 s
h
· CeffBatt (6.1)
where:
• Vcc=voltage;
4They rise the Vcutoff .
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• CeffBatt=Total battery capacity really usable by a load and expressed in Ah5.
The remaining capacity of the batteries after a t∗ seconds long operation, measured
in Ah, is expressed by the following equation:
U = U ′ −
∫ to+t∗
t0
I(t)dt (6.2)
where:
• U ′ is the remaining capacity as result from the previous calculation step, and
measured in Ah;
• I(t) is the current drained from the batteries at time t, measured in A;
The equation above 6.2 can also be expressed in terms of the energy requested from
the batteries, expressed in Joule, or in other words:
U = U ′ − 3600 s
h
∫ to+t∗
t0
E(t)
Vcc
dt + R′(e) (6.3)
where R(e) is the non linear function of the charge recovery eﬀects of the batteries,
represented as a decreasing exponential function of the state of charge of the battery
[127].
Power consumption assumption
The batteries model can be easily achieved from the 6.2, assuming that:
5Experimentally it has been measured as the 80% of total capacity
Chapter 6. WSN Failure Model 105
• the integration interval is small enough to consider the energy consumption
constant;
• the voltage of the battery is constant, since we suppose that the load (the node)
does not absorb excessive current to cause drop of voltage on DC-DC converter;
Under these assumptions the Equation 6.3 can be expressed with respect to the
Energy E as:
E = E′ − EΔt +  (6.4)
with  being the contribution of the charge recovery eﬀect function. From the previous
Figure 6.8: Finite state automata relative to the battery model
assumptions it is correct to consider that the ”state of charge” of the battery can
be considered as the remaining energy. That allows to model the above equation
by means of the automata outlined in Fig. 6.8. N is assumed to be the number of
charge units that can be drained from the battery under constant discharge. In the
proposed schema, every request for discharge of i energy unit causes a transition in
the state correspondent to the level of remaining energy. Dually the phenomena of
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.9: (a) SAN model of the Power Supply FM; (b) Output gate deﬁnition of
charge drawn.
recovery causes transitions in the opposite sense.
San Model
Figure 6.9.(a). shows the SAN model of the power supply component. It models
stuck-at-zero and reset failures of a single node, by considering the natural battery
discharge process, charge recovery eﬀect and anomalous energy requests due to hard-
ware faults.
Node’s natural battery discharge process can be thought as the sum of two main
contributions: i) processing activity, including CPU, I/O devices (e.g., leds), and
sensing hardware, and ii) radio activity. T Node activity is considered as the alter-
nation between two states: “running” and “sleep”. The CPU awakening is modeled
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through a timed deterministic action (wake up). At each awakening, the output
gate charge drawn drains the energy requested by the processing activity (see Figure
6.9.(b)).
The other contribution (radio activity) is modeled in the Routing model. In
particular, a proper amount of energy is drained every time a packet is sent, received
or forwarded, depending on the current radio power being used, and on the size of
the packet.
As reported in Figure 6.9.(b), the charge drawn output gate is in charge of modeling
stuck-at-zero and reset failures. A stuck-at-zero occurs when the residual charge
is not suﬃcient to satisfy the processing request. Hence a token is placed in the
battery failed place. A reset is instead caused by anomalous energy requests due to
temporary hardware faults. As shown in [86], these faults can be modeled as a Weibull
stochastic process. When this activity ﬁres, a token is moved in the inducedReset
place. Figure 3.b also shows how model parameters (such as the energy consumption
aliquot) can be gathered from the Changes Manager.
Finally, the model also takes into account nonlinear phenomena due to the so-called
energy “recovery eﬀect” [128], which is typical of several battery technologies (e.g.,
nickel metal hydride), apart from lithium batteries. The eﬀect is modeled through
a timed action (battery recovery). When the action ﬁres, the remaining charge is
increased of a quantity which value depends on the adopted battery technology.
We validate the battery model by simulating a single node model and no failures. In
this test, the Mica2 platform [23] is considered, achieving a 170 hours node lifetime,
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against the 172 hours lifetime measured on a real stand alone node running a simple
broadcast counter application, as reported in [129, 16].
6.3.4 Communication Failure Model
(a)
(b)
Figure 6.10: (a) Connection failure SAN model; (b) Output gate deﬁnition of checkConnec-
tion.
Figure 6.10.(a) shows the SAN of the Communication failure model. It models the
behavior of the node when isolation failures occur. The model reproduces diﬀerent
behaviors depending on the nature of the routing tree update policy, namely if a reac-
tive or proactive routing algorithm is being simulated [115]. If the proactive routing
is considered, the model checks for isolation failures periodically (routingTimer ac-
tivity). In the reactive case, the model checks for isolation failures when needed, i.e.
Chapter 6. WSN Failure Model 109
before sending a packet. In particular, the reactive input gate enable the execution
of the gate check connection just before sending a packet. In order to simplify the
model, the route update is not executed every time, but only when there is a change
in the topology. This is accomplished exploiting the places somebody isolated and
somebody connected that contain the ID of the last node manifesting a failure or the
ID of the node that re-connected to the network, respectively. If the ID of the node
contained in one of the mentioned places is present on the routing tree, or is a neigh-
bor of a checking node, then the route is updated. In the case of proactive routing,
this check is executed periodically. The code of the gate check connection is reported
in Figure 6.10.(b)., The function computeRoutingTable() provided by the Changes
Manager (line 2 of Figure 6.10.(b)) is in charge of recomputing the routing tree of the
node toward the sink node, i.e. it evaluate the route to the sink, if any. If there no
route to the sink, (the checking node is isolated), a token is moved from the connected
to the isolated place (lines 9-12). Similarly, when a node becomes connected after
the computation of the routing table (e.g., nodes on the path to the sink recover), a
token is moved from the isolated place to the connected place (lines 4-8). Then an
isolation or reconnect event is notiﬁed to the Changes Manager, in order to propagate
the event to all the interested nodes, and to compute new parameters for the model
consistently with the updated topology. Note that the token from the running place
is not removed when the node becomes isolated, modeling the common situation of
a node which is up and running, but no more connected to the network. In this case,
the node continues to produce packets, hence continuing to discharge its batteries.
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Figure 6.11: Internal structure of the ”‘Sensor”’ FM
6.3.5 Sensor Board Failure Model
Sensor board failures are strictly dependent on the sensing hardware being used.
Hence, we implemented a number of SAN libraries concerning the most common
used sensor boards in WSN applications. Information collected by the user interface
(see Section 5.1) indicates which sensor board is used for the WSN nodes, and which
template among those available has to be specialized for the node model.
Figure 6.11 illustrates the conceptual structure of the sensor board model template.
The hardware dependent part of the model is shown in the cloud, and need to be
specialized according to user preferences. The places out of the cloud are the “in-
terface” of this sub-model. Through the interface, the model generates and receives
events related to other sub-models. The “sensorFailure” activity models the failing
behavior of the board, according to an exponential distribution with constant rate
[130], which depends on the adopted hardware. The part of the model reproducing
speciﬁc hardware behavior is modeled starting from a FMEA approach (see section
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6.1) conducted on several sensor boards, and added to the template by the model
generation component (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1) . For example, to model the
Crossbow Weather board [124], humidity, temperature and light sensor failures have
been considered. The speciﬁc failure modes, and their rates, have been speciﬁed
according to [124], where several failure dynamics related to this board have been
observed. For the Crossbow sensor board, after the generation process we achieve
the following failure model.
Crossbow Weather Board Failure Model
Figure 6.12 shows the SAN model of the Mica2 weather sensor board. The model is
composed by two main sections:
1. failure event section;
2. recovery section.
The exponential distribution activities fail sensor action and represents the times to
failure of the sensor board. After the ith failure, which is represented by the number
of tokens in the places permanent and transient, the time to the next failure is reduced
by using a distribution with a mean equal to the original one divided by 2i. When
the number of tokens of the places Num sensors (initialized at a value equal to the
number of the sensors on the board) becomes zero, the token is extracted from the
place running, and the node becomes unavailable. The situation is the same when
critical failures, such as those causing the stuck of the node (place stuck), such as
failures of the humidity sensor. The place stuck is connected to the interface of the
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model node state (see the Section 6.3.1)
The exponential activities Normal and Burst represent the alternation of normal pe-
riods whose expected duration is indicated by the parameter TN , where the failures
occurs with rate λN , and of abnormal periods, having expected duration TB, char-
acterized by a higher rate λB. The rate of the exponential activity fail sensor, is λN
or λB, depending on the marking of the places NormalHWF and burstHWF.
Each time the action (Sensor fail) ﬁres, the choice of the sensor responsible for the
fault is made, with respect to the statistics obtained by failure data analysis presented
in [11]. The sensor is put as unavailable after its failure. This operation demands
a re-normalization of remaining probabilities relating to the sensors still operating.
Dually, after an action of recovery of a sensor, the probability of failure for the sensor
(through the actions with the post-ﬁx recover) is restored to a value diﬀerent from
zero, demanding a new action of re-normalization.
The action will stuck models the time to failure of the node, when given conditions
are met, as observed in [11]. It follows a Weibull6 distribution with shape parameter
α = 27. Considering the statistics provided in [11] for the considered sensor board,
null reading failures are likely to cause in the 45% of the cases permanent node
failures within two days, and the following value for the distribution parameters are
achieved:
6F (x) = 1− e−λtα is the temporal distribution of probability
7The shape equal to 2 is translated in a hazard rate h(t) that it increases linearly over time
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P (x < t∗ + 172800s | x > t∗) = 0.55
P (x < t∗ + 172800 | x > t∗) = P (t
∗ < x < t∗ + 172800)
P (x > t∗)
Fx(t∗ + 172800s) + Fx(t∗)
1− Fx(t∗) =
e−λ(t∗)2 − e−λ(t∗+172800)2
e−λ(t∗)2
=
1− e
−λ(t∗+172800)2
e−λ(t∗)2
= 1− e−λ·172800·(172800+2(t∗)2) = 0.55
⇒ λ = − ln(0.45)
1728002 + 345600t∗
(6.5)
where t∗ indicates the time in which the failure of the sensor has taken place.
Similar consideration is made regarding recovery actions, modeled as a lognormal
distribution with shape parameter equal to 2 and λ in such way that within 1 day
the 90% of the transient failures are recovered.
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Figure 6.12: Mobius schema of the failure model of the Crossbow Weather sensor
board
Chapter 7
Case Studies
This chapter describes the results obtained following the approach proposed in this thesis,
and it focuses on three diﬀerent WSN deployments, namely a 10 nodes in line WSN, a 50
nodes randomly deployed WSN, and a 30 nodes WSN deployed on a hypothetical bridge. The
simulations aim at showing how the approach proposed in this thesis can be adopted to evaluate
signiﬁcant resiliency measures for a speciﬁc network, when varying application conﬁguration
and routing protocols.
7.1 Selecting realistic case studies
In order to consider realistic scenarios, we analyzed the experiences reported in the
ﬁeld of WSN for environmental and structural monitoring.
Table 7.1 reports a number of real world case studies on bridges and tunnels
([131, 132, 133, 134]), buildings and infrastructures ([135, 6, 136, 137, 138]), and
environment ([11]) monitoring. In particular, for each work, we report information
about number of nodes, size of radio packets, application duty-cycle, topology, routing
algorithm being used and, where speciﬁed, measured network lifetime. From Table
7.1 we can see that the typical number of sensor nodes used in such applications is
around to few tens which are typically organized in a in-line, 2-lines or grid topology.
For such installations, radio packet sizes are always around tens of Bytes. Reported
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Table 7.1: Analysis of existing studies
Work Nodes Packet Duty-cycle Topology Routing Measured
[Byte] [s] lifetime
[136] 25 80 0.5 grid Reliable several
m-hop weeks
[131] 14 6 600 2 lines Regular 6
m-hop months
[131] 13 6 600 2 lines custom NA
[132] 12 NA NA 2 lines Reliable NA
m-hop
[134] 18 NA NA 2 lines NA NA
[139] 48 NA NA 2 lines NA NA
[6] 16 NA 4 custom Regular 3.2
m-hop months
[133] 64 36 43200 1 line Regular NA
m-hop
[135] 8 NA NA 1 line Regular NA
m-hop
[137] 15 50 NA grid custom NA
Regular/
[138] 14 16 0.5 2 lines Reliable NA
m-hop
[11] 43 32 300 custom Regular 4
m-hop months
[11] 92 32 1200 custom Regular 2.5
m-hop months
duty-cycles, instead, are diﬀerent since they depend on application requirements. It
ranges from 1 or more packets generated per second, up to a packet generated each
12 hours. Finally, adopted routing algorithms are multi-hop and reliable multi-hop
(see Section 3.3), other than custom implementations. Details on mentioned routing
protocols can be found in [115].
Table 7.2 reports the details of all the case studies performed in the following
sections. In particular, to easily show the capabilities of the proposed approach, we
consider three case studies related to diﬀerent platform, topology, applications, and
routing algorithms.
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Table 7.2: Performed Experiments
Platform Case Nodes Packet Duty-cycle Topology Routing Metrics
Study [Byte] [s]
Xbow 1 10 25 2,4,20 in line Regular m-hop MTTF, uptime
Mica 2 1* 13 25 2,4,20 hybrid in line Regular m-hop MTTF, uptime
Xbow 120, Regular m-hop Connection Res.
Mica Z 2 50 25 600, random Reliable m-hop , data delivery Res.
1800 random walk lifetime
Regular m-hop
Reliable m-hop Connection Res.
Xbow 3 30 [25,250] 360,3600 Bridge random walk, data delivery Res.
Mica Z gossiping lifetime,
ﬂooding overhead
7.2 Experiments on simple in line topology
Figure 7.1 depict the topology composed of 10 nodes considered in this set of exper-
iments. The inter node distances are set so that nodes are able to communicate only
with their 1-hop neighbors. Despite its simplicity, this deployment is often adopted
in many real-world applications as shown in Table 7.1. Moreover, this topology can
be thought as a single branch of a more complex topology.
Figure 7.1: The considered linear topology.
7.2.1 Evaluated Metrics
The metrics we evaluate are: i) node uptime, and ii) node Mean Time To Failure
(MTTF), referred to isolation failures (see Table 6.1). The node uptime is deﬁned
as the availability of a node (probability that a node is running) multiplied by the
overall observation period. They have been deﬁned as reward variables in the Mobius
tool [140].
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For several applications, it is interesting to evaluate such metrics per cluster of
nodes. A cluster of nodes can be considered as a group of nodes which lays in the
spatial proximity of each other and which shares the same neighboring nodes. The
cluster uptime can be deﬁned as the maximum of uptime values of all the nodes be-
longing to the cluster. In the same way, the cluster MTTF is the maximum of MTTF
values of all cluster nodes. We chose these deﬁnitions because they are consistent
with the mission of the WSN as a whole, instead of the mission of single nodes:
nodes belonging to the same cluster are indeed usually adopted to monitor the same
environmental phenomena. Moreover, it is suﬃcient that a single node per cluster is
available to let produced measurements be forwarded to the sink
It is worth noting that other metrics can be simply deﬁned using the same for-
malism. Hence the measurements can be tailored for the speciﬁc objectives of the
analysis.
Sensitivities analysis are conducted on these metrics as a function of both the
workload and the failure rate. The workload can be considered as the set of activities
periodically performed by each node (measuring, computing, transmitting, receiving
and forwarding) every X seconds, where X is the so called “duty-cycle“ or “idle
period“.
In this set of experiments, attention is focused on measures related to links in-
stead of nodes because, as reported in Section 6.1, the WSN fails when ( see Table
6.1): a) the amount of data delivered to the sink is less than a given threshold (data
delivery failure), and/or b) when a subset of the network is not able to reach the
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Table 7.3: Parameters used for the simulation process (their values are provided by
the External Engine)
Variable Type Range type Range
isReactive bool Fixed 1
bandwidth int Fixed 19600
batteryEnergyJoule int Fixed 11700
CoverageThreshold double Fixed 0.7
CpuEnergySeconds double Fixed 2,00E-06
dutyCycle int Manual [2,4,20]
numberOfNodes int Fixed 10
packetSize int Manual 50
defaultRXRadioConsumption double Fixed 4.0E-5
defaultTXRadioConsumption double Fixed 6.5E-5
routingType int Fixed 0
TimerCheckConnection int Fixed 20
sensorFailureRate double Manual [1E-7, 5E-7, 9E-7, 1.1E-6]
simulationTime int Fixed 30 days
timeOutACK int Fixed 20
sink (disconnection failure). Node oriented metrics could return a ﬁner-grain anal-
ysis however not useful and not cost-eﬀective when evaluating the whole network.
Moreover considering only the coverage failures will results in a too much coarse-
grain analysis. Metrics i) and ii) are a good trade-oﬀ between detailed analysis and
evaluation costs.
7.2.2 Simulation Setup
Table 7.3 summarizes most of the parameters of the SAN model, along with the
values we adopted for the experiments. Actual values for these parameters have been
gathered from the related work (see section 2). The last three parameters are set
as variable. In particular, sensor failure rate and idle period parameters are used to
conduct sensitivity analysis, hence their values change during the simulation.
Each simulated node is a Crossbow Mica2, which has an Atmel ATmega128L
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microcontroller with 4 KB of RAM, 128 KB of ash, and a CC1000 radio. The radio
operates at 968 MHz, transmits at 38.4 Kbps, and uses Manchester encoding. Each
node was attached to a Crossbow Weather board [39, 124, 23] equipped with light,
humidity and temperature sensors. We assume every node to run a typical TinyOS
multi-hop application which senses and sends light and temperature values to a sink
node periodically, in multi-hop fashion, without stand-by periods, i.e. periods spent
by node in a low power state.
The model has been numerically solved using the Mobius tool, by performing a
transient analysis in a period of 30 days. The assumed observation period is longer
than the maximum expected lifetime of a single node [129] for the considered platform
and application i.e. 200 hours, considering the nature of the proposed application
(always-on and periodic WSN).
7.2.3 Results
Figure 7.2 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis conducted on the node uptime
and MTTF as a function of the idle period (i.e., the workload) and the failure rate.
In particular, Figures 7.2.a and 7.2.b show the results obtained with a failure rate
ﬁxed to 5E − 7 and a idle period varying from 20 seconds down to 4 and 2 seconds.
Figures 7.2.c and 7.2.d are relative to a ﬁxed idle period (4 seconds) and a varying
failure rate (1E − 7, 5E − 7, 9E − 7, 1.1E − 6 failures per second - fps). The plotted
values are obtained within a relative conﬁdence interval of 95% of their mean and
variance.
As one could expect, the longer the idle period, the higher the uptime. As a
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7.2: Uptime (a),(c) and Mean Time To Isolate (b),(d) both in hours, for topology
of ﬁg.7.1: (a) and (b) for diﬀerent idle period of the application with constant failure rate of
5E − 7, (c) and (d) for diﬀerent failure rate for a idle period of 4s.
general result, the estimated slope of the uptime increases as the idle period decreases,
for the considered topology. More in detail, for the 20s idle period experiment, the
uptime assumes almost the same value for the last 6 nodes, then it starts to decrease.
This is due to the critical value that the aggregated traﬃc assumes, starting from node
3 down to 1. In other terms, the more a node/cluster is close to the sink, the more
traﬃc it has to manage, the faster it will discharge its battery. This eﬀect “shifts”
to the right as the idle period decreases. In particular, for idle periods equal to 4s
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and 2s, the uptime starts to signiﬁcantly decrease from nodes 6 and 8, respectively
(short idle periods involve more traﬃc to be produced).
Moreover, for the last experiment (duty cycle of 2s) more than one knee can be noted
on the plot due to the great traﬃc that ﬂows into the network: on the fourth and
sixth ‘hop’.
Figure 7.2.b outlines the values obtained for the MTTF. This plot evidences the
occurrence of isolation failures and how they propagate into the network. Consis-
tently with intuition, the MTTF is a decreasing function of the distance to the sink.
For instance, the failure of the node 2 implies that all other nodes, from 3 to 9, are
isolated. Moreover, the plots translate down as the idle period decreases. It is inter-
esting to relate MTTF estimates to uptime estimates. For example, with reference to
the 20s idle period, node number 9 is alive for 153.2 hours (Figure 7.2.a). However,
it is able to reach the sink for only 113.3 hours on average, wasting about 40 hours
of its lifetime.
As for Figures 7.2.c and 7.2.d, the relationship between the plots is dual to the one
observed in the previous case. When the failure rate increases, the uptime plots trans-
lates down (Figure 7.2.c), whereas the MTTF plots slope increases (Figure 7.2.d).
This last behavior is intuitive: the more often a node fails, the more often its child
nodes will result isolated. Note that the uptime plots obtained in correspondence of
failure rates equal to 9E − 7, 1.1E − 6 failures per second exhibit a more irregular
proﬁle, due to the big impact of node failures: if a node fails, its one-hop neighbor
will be subject to less traﬃc to be forwarded, hence it will live longer.
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7.2.4 Improving the linear Topology
Measurements obtained for the linear topology show that the more a node is next to
the sink, the more it is prone to fail. Although peripheral nodes are less stressed, they
also fail prematurely, due to the isolation from the sink. A resiliency improvement
would thus be the MTTF improvement of peripheral nodes. To this aim, an intuitive
approach is to enforces the network topology duplicating the nodes in proximity of
the sink. Speciﬁcally, node 1 is duplicated with node 10, forming a pseudo-node 1’,
node 2 with 11, forming 2’, and node 3 with node 12, forming 3’ as shown in Figure
7.3.a. for a 30% cost increase. This enforcement introduces redundant paths into
the network, so as to tolerate the failure of one of the nodes belonging to one of the
mentioned groups (pseudo-nodes).
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 7.3: (a) Improved topology: alternative paths are outlined with dotted arrows; (b)
and (c) MTTF achieved measures.
Chapter 7. Case Studies 124
Let us describe how the proposed approach helps to quantify the resiliency im-
provement we expect for this enforced topology. The MTTF beneﬁt introduced by
this simple improvement is shown in Figures 7.3.b and 7.3.c. The Figure report the
MTTF as a function of the distance of the replicas to the sink, when varying the idle
period and the failure rate. We observe an overall improvement of the MTTF for all
the nodes, especially for the peripheral ones. With reference to Figure 7.3.b, the last
node results isolated after 127h, 121h and 110 h respectively, instead of 114h, 105h
and 96h obtained with the linear topology. A rapid change of slope can be observed
at the third cluster. The change is justiﬁable by the fact that node 4 acts as a bottle-
neck for all the network traﬃc, hence failing prematurely and causing the isolation
of all the nodes that depend on it. From Figure 7.3.c it is interesting observe that,
for a low failure rate (1E-7 fps), a almost constant MTTF is obtained (almost equals
to 155h). In this case, we obtain a MTTF increment for the last node of about 27
hours (21% of improvement). This also applies to other nodes. It is also clear that
even in this case node 4 still represent a resiliency bottleneck for the given topology.
7.3 Experiment on a Random Topology
This section presents results of the simulation of a WSN of 50 nodes randomly de-
ployed. The topology has been generated achieving a distribution of number of
neighbors per node reported in Figure 7.4 In our analysis, we consider 3 distinct
routing algorithms, namely i) multihop, ii) TinyOS Reliable Multihop, iii) Random
Parent Selection, here referred as random routing. For each considered algorithm,
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we evaluate a set of metrics to pinpoint both dependability bottlenecks and, for the
considered topology, the most appropriate routing algorithm among those consid-
ered. The same approach can be followed by a hypothetic user of the model, who
can exploit simulation results to ﬁne-tune his applications.
Figure 7.4: Initial Routing tree for the considered topology
7.3.1 Evaluated Metrics
The following metrics (or reward variables) are used to evaluate system performances:
- Connection Resiliency as a function of time, deﬁned as the average number of
alive and not isolated nodes, evaluated on a daily basis. The metric can be used to
estimate the maximum mission time after which the WSN is no more able to fulﬁll
the required coverage.
- Relative Data Delivery Resiliency as a function of time, deﬁned as the
average number of useful packets delivered to the sink over the number of produced
packets, evaluated on a daily basis. It is useful to estimate the maximum mission
time after which the WSN is no more able to deliver the required fraction of data to
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the sink.
Node lifetime deﬁned as the summing of all the interval of times where the
node is not failed.
Consistently with the former set of performed experiments, the workload is con-
sidered as the set of activities periodically performed by each node (measuring, com-
puting, transmitting, receiving and forwarding) every X seconds, where X is the
”duty cycle”. We assume every node to run a typical TinyOS multi-hop application
which senses and sends measurements to a sink node periodically (node 0) according
to the adopted routing algorithm. We focus on the Mica2 platform, equipped with
the Chipcon CC1000 radio devices at 968MHz and weather sensor board.
7.3.2 Simulation setup
Table 7.4 summarizes most of the parameters of the SAN model, along with the
values adopted for the experiments. Actual values for these parameters have been
gathered from real settings [11]. Sensitivity analyses are conducted by computing
the mentioned metrics as a function of i) node duty cycle (120s, 600s, and 1800s),
and ii) failure rate (1E-7, 5E-7, 9E-7, 1.1E-6 failures per hour). The model has been
numerically solved using the Mobius tool, by performing a transient analysis in a
period of 60 days. It is worth noting that in this set of experiments we consider
a larger time horizon for the simulation than in the former case studies, since the
simulated application use a larger duty-cycle, and hence nodes are likely to survive
for a larger amount of time.
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Table 7.4: Values for parameters used in the simulations.
Variable Type Range type Range
numberOfRetries int Fixed 5
isReactive bool Fixed 1
TTL short Fixed 50
ackSize int Fixed 1
aggregationTime int Fixed 10
bandwidth int Fixed 39600
batteryEnergyJoule int Fixed 11700
CoverageThreshold double Fixed 0.7
CpuEnergySeconds double Fixed 2,00E-06
IsDataAggregation bool Fixed 0
dutyCycle int Manual [120, 600, 1800]
gossipingProbability double Fixed 0.3
numberOfNodes int Fixed 50
packetSize int Manual 25
defaultRXRadioConsumption double Fixed 0.00004
defaultTXRadioConsumption double Fixed 6.5E-5
routingType int Manual [0,1,2,3,4]
TimerCheckConnection int Fixed 60
sensorFailureRate double Manual [1E-7, 5E-7, 9E-7, 1.1E-6]
simulationTime int Fixed 7776000
timeOutACK int Fixed 20
7.3.3 Results
Figure 7.5 sketches the routing tree computed on the considered topology at the
startup of the simulation by the multihop algorithm (both regular and reliable). As
shown in Figure 7.5, there are several nodes that act as leaf nodes, i.e. nodes without
children, while there are other nodes, such as node 47, acting as router node for
a conspicuous amount of nodes (for node 47, we account for 24 nodes). Consistent
with the intuition, such router nodes are more stressed by the forwarding activity and
hence more prone to fail. A failure of one of such nodes requires the re-computation
of the routing tree since new router nodes have to been selected in order to reach the
sink. For instance, we measured for node 47 a lifetime of only about 15 days over
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the 60 simulated. Consequently, after the failure of node 47, a new router is selected
. In this case, the analysis showed that node 48, a leaf node in the former topology,
starts to act as a router node, replacing node 47. Figure 7.4 reports the distribution
of the number of neighbor per node.
Figure 7.5: Initial Routing tree for the considered topology
This eﬀect manifests more frequently when adopting the multihop and the reliable
multihop algorithms, since they tend to use the same set of routes while available,
hence overloading always the same set of nodes. This is very unlikely to happen when
using the random routing algorithm. This algorithm acts selecting randomly one of
the neighbors from the neighbor list, for each packet sent, thus distributing the load
in the network. While this could seam an acceptable solution, its main drawback is
that often packets transit following non optimal routes, in turn increasing the average
hops to pass to reach the sink, causing a low level of packets delivered to the sink.
Figure 7.6.(a) provides an example of estimation of the connection resiliency. In
the ﬁrst days, the coverage of the two multihop based algorithms is higher than
that delivered by the random routing. However, as nodes start to fail (both due
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(a) (b)
Figure 7.6: (a) Connection Resiliency for the considered routing protocols, and for
duty cycle = 600s, failure rate = 5e-7 f/h, packet length = 25B; (b)Data Delivery
Resiliency for packet size of 25B, duty cycle 600s and failure rate 5E-7 f/h
to hardware failures, network partition or battery depletion), the random routing
algorithm tends to deliver better connection resiliency than the others. As shown in
Figure 7, this is due to the uniform discharge induced by selecting a random parent in
place of a ﬁxed one, with the ﬁnal eﬀect of increasing the average number of surviving
nodes, and consequently, the overall connection resiliency.
Figure 7.6.(b) shows the metric of data delivery resiliency of the considered rout-
ing algorithms, for a packet size of 25Bytes, a failure rate of 5e-7 f/h and a duty-cycle
of 1 packet generated per 600s. Coherently with the intuition, the reliable multihop
is capable of delivering a larger amount of useful data to the sink (packet that are not
duplicated) - 95% on average of the generated packets. On the other side, the random
routing, while showing interesting characteristics for the coverage, is not capable of
delivering acceptable performance, since it is only capable of delivering 36% of the
packets, on average.
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Figure 7.7: Data Delivery Resiliency for packet size of 25B, duty cycle 600s and
failure rate 5E-7 f/h
Figure 7.7 shows the lifetime distributions related to the considered routing algo-
rithms.
Table 7.5 shows statistics for the distribution of Figure 7.7. As reported, the
random routing enables 23 nodes out of 50 nodes to reach the end of the simulation
without failing (maximum value for the lifetime, i.e., 60 days), while the multihop
and reliable multihop allow only 9 and 2 nodes to reach the maximum lifetime,
respectively. The distributions of Figure 7.7 shows also that the lifetime distributions
related to the reliable multihop routing has a small range of variance (26 days), tightly
concentrating values for the lifetime of nodes around the mean of 49 days.
This translates in a more foreseeable behavior of the WSN due the small interval
for node lifetime values. Moreover, the reliable multihop is capable of delivering a
higher rate of information to the sink node than the regular multihop, however at the
price of an additional overhead due to the acknowledgement, and extra transmissions
of lost packets. Oppositely, while the random algorithm delivers higher coverage and
smaller overhead, it is not capable of delivering the same amount of information to
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Table 7.5: Statistics for the lifetime distributions shown in Figure 7.7
statistics Multihop Rel. Multihop Random
No. Of observations 49 49 49
Minimum 23 34 24
Maximum 60 60 60
Freq. Of Minumum 1 1 1
Freq. Of Maximum 9 2 23
Range 37 26 36
1st Quartile 44 45 43
Median 51 49 57
3rd Quartile 55 55 60
Mean 49,857 49,184 51,163
Standard Deviation 7,962 6,435 10,502
the sink as the multihop.
As ﬁnal analysis, for the considered topology, platform and for the considered
parameters, the simulation pinpoints the reliable multihop as the most convenient
routing algorithm to be used in order to achieve a good trade-oﬀ between the lifetime
of the network and the amount of data delivered to the sink. Analysis for diﬀerent
value of parameters revealed similar insights showing that the reliable multihop is
an eﬀective solution when dealing with large networks with non negligible failure
rates. It also pointed out that the random routing is a viable solution for smaller
networks and short duty-cycle where the overhead of the reliable multihop overweighs
the provided beneﬁts.
7.4 Experiment on a Real Topology
The objective of the following analysis is to demonstrate how the proposed approach
may be employed during the design of a WSN for infrastructure monitoring.
Consistently with the size of the real world case studies reported in Table 7.1, we
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Figure 7.8: Topology of the studied WSN
focus on a 30 nodes WSN covering a hypothetic bridge composed of a 250 meters
suspended roadway and of two 50 meters high towers. The 2-dimensional topology
of the considered WSN is depicted in Figure 7.8.
7.4.1 Evaluated Metrics
According to the deﬁnitions provided in Section 3, the following reward metrics are
evaluated:
- Relative Connection Resiliency as a function of the number of manifested
failures, deﬁned as the fraction of alive and not isolated nodes over the number of
alive nodes. This metric is useful to measure the WSN ability to keep the network
connected in the presence of failures.
- Absolute Connection Resiliency as a function of time, deﬁned as the average
number of alive and not isolated nodes, evaluated on a daily basis. The metric can
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be used to estimate the maximum mission time after which the WSN is no more able
to fulﬁll the required coverage.
- Relative Data Delivery Resiliency as a function of the number of mani-
fested failures, deﬁned as the fraction of useful packets delivered to the sink over
the number of produced packets. It is used to measure the WSN ability to keep the
required data delivery eﬃciency in the presence of failures.
- Relative Data Delivery Resiliency as a function of time, deﬁned as the average
number of useful packets delivered to the sink over the number of produced packets,
evaluated on a daily basis. It is useful to estimate the maximum mission time after
which the WSN is no more able to deliver the required fraction of data to the sink.
- Overhead, deﬁned as the ratio between the number of non useful packets (dupli-
cated and corrupted) and useful packets delivered to the sink in ΔT , i.e.
Overhead(ΔT ) =
Dup Packets(ΔT ) + Corr Packets(ΔT )
Useful Packets(ΔT )
(7.1)
- Node Lifetime deﬁned as the time after which a node stops working.
7.4.2 Evaluation Strategy
We aim to assess the WSN resiliency as a function of routing algorithms and several
application parameters values. We focus on the following routing algorithms: i)
multihop, ii) TinyOS reliable multihop, iii) random parent selection1, iv) gossiping,
and v) ﬂooding. As for application parameters, we focus on packet sizes (from 25 up
to 250 Byes) and application duty-cycles (from 3600 down to 360 seconds). Finally,
1here referred as random routing
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since there is no agreement in the literature on the hardware failure rate of these
networks, we repeat each analysis for diﬀerent failure rates. The rate of the hardware
faults is 1 each 115 days (1E-7 failures per second - fps) and 11,5 days (1E-6 fps).
In the following, results of three out of eight possible experimental campaigns are
reported:
Experiment 1: low workload (packet size of 25B and duty-cycle of 3600s) and low
failure rate (1E-7 fps);
Experiment 2: high workload (packet size of 250B and duty-cycle of 360s) and low
failure rate, to analyze the impact of a more stressful application;
Experiment 3: low workload and high failure rate (1E-6 fps), to analyze the con-
sequences due to a harsher environment.
We use the Mobius modeling environment [119] to simulate the SAN model. A
simulation on a period of 6 months is used. The conﬁdence level is 95%. Unless
otherwise speciﬁed, the parameter values are as in Table 7.6.
According to the proposed approach, experiments consist of the following phases.
behavioral simulation. The topology is built and the network is simulated
by the TOSSIM simulator. Values for static parameters are gathered and stored in
simulator logs. As for the sensor node, we focus on Crossbow MicaZ platform, which
is the evolution of the Mica2 [23], which has an Atmel ATmega128L microcontroller
with 4 KB of RAM, 128 KB of ash, and a CC2420 radio. The radio operates at 2.4GHz
using the Zig-Bee standard, and it transmits at 256 Kbps. Each node was attached to
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Table 7.6: Simulation parameters
Parameters Description Default Value
Energy PerReceivedBit Energy consumption for radio activity, per received bit 1.36E-6J
Energy PerSentBit Energy consumption for radio activity, per sent bit 2,80E-06J
NumberOfRetries Number of retries when sending a packet, after that 3
if no ack is received, the packet is discarded 3
TimeToLive Time to Live of sent packets 15
Vcc Batteries Voltage 3V
Ack Size Size of the acknowledgement in Byte 10B
Bandwidth Available bandwidth 19200 bit/s
Batt energy Total battery energy in Joule 10800J
Cpu Consumption CPU active Energy Consumption in mA 0.0087mA
Cpu IdleConsumption CPU idle Energy Consumption in mA 2.16E-4mA
Duty Cycle Application duty cycle [3600.0s, 360.0s]
Gossiping Prob Probability of gossiping - used in gossiping routing 0.03
Sensor number Number of sensors composing the sensor board 3
Nodes number Number of nodes 30
Packet Size Size of the packets in Byte [25B, 250B]
Routing Type Type of routing algorithm. 0 multihop [0-4]
1 reliable multihop, 2 random, 3 gossiping, 4 ﬂooding [0-4]
Routing time Time period for sending route check packets 120s
Sensors fault rate Rate of sensor board hardware faults [1.0E-7fps, 1.0E-6fps]
Simulation End Simulation time 15552001s
Ack timeout Time-out after that a packet is resent 20s
a Crossbow Weather board equipped with light, humidity and temperature sensors
[39, 124].We assume every node to run a typical WSN application which senses and
sends light and temperature values to a sink node, periodically. We assume that all
nodes are initially equipped with two AA lithium ions batteries capable of providing
10800 Joules of total energy (see Table 7.6).
Model generation. The Model Generator component is used to generate the
SAN model by using the result of the behavioral simulation. Single node models are
joined together forming the WSN failure model, according to the simulated topology.
The Changes Manager component is added to the model as an external library and
the overall model is compiled into a single executable ﬁle.
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SAN model simulation. The SAN model is simulated and the reward variables
are estimated.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.9: Relative connection resiliency against the number of manifested failures.
(a) Experiment 1, (b) Experiment 2, (c) Experiment 3. Comparing (a) and (b), the
diﬀerence between algorithms is more evident as the workload increases. Comparing
(a) and (c), an increasing slope can be observed when the failure rate increases, and
no diﬀerences are observed between routing algorithms, since hardware faults become
the predominant cause of node failures.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.10: Absolute connection resiliency against time. (a) Experiment 1, (b)
Experiment 2, (c) Experiment 3.
7.4.3 Results from Low Failure Rate Scenario
Figures 7.9-7.13 show the results of the performed analysis.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.11: Relative data resiliency against the number of manifested failures. (a)
Experiment 1, (b) Experiment 2, (c) Experiment 3. Comparing (a) and (b), ﬂooding,
gossiping and reliable multi-hop show a sharp drop, which is increased and anticipated
in the case of higher workload. Random and regular multi-hop are less sensitive to
workload changes, at the cost of lower resiliency. Comparing (a) and (c), Diﬀerences
between ﬂooding, gossiping and reliable multi-hop are mitigated by the higher failure
rates. At the end in ﬁg. (c), after several failures, all the algorithms tend to the same
resiliency level.
Figure 7.9.(a) reports the relative connection resiliency against the number of
manifested failures in the network2 for Experiment 1. Initially, all the considered
routing algorithms rebound to failures in a similar way, despite their diﬀerent be-
havior. Diﬀerences start to be noticed after the 25th failure (connection resiliency
of about 0.7) when the resiliency of gossiping and ﬂooding start to decrease more
sharply. This is mainly due to the higher overhead these algorithms cause in the
network (see Figure 7.13.(a)), which cause a collapse of the WSN at a given point.
The positive slope shown for multi-hop and reliable multi-hop algorithm after the
30th failure is indicative also of transient isolation failures, i.e. induced by transient
hardware failures of inner nodes. This eﬀect is however not observable if looking
2note that both transient and permanent failures are considered in this work, hence the number
of observed failures can be greater than the number of nodes.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.12: Relative data resiliency against time. (a) Experiment 1, (b) Experiment
2, (c) Experiment 3. The diﬀerences observed in sub-ﬁg. (c) after 64 days are not
signiﬁcant, since at that time almost all nodes are failed, as shown in Fig. 7.10.(c).
at Figure 7.10.(a), which reports the absolute connection resiliency as a function of
time. This is due to the diﬀerent scale: the time-to-failure process is not uniform
with respect to time, and several failures tend to concentrate at the last days of
exercise. On the other hand, 7.10.(a) is useful to estimate the maximum mission
time after which the WSN is no more able to fulﬁll the required connectivity degree.
Hence, it might be useful to schedule maintenance actions in advance (e.g., battery
replacement and damaged sensor nodes substitution). The collapse is also observable
from Figure 7.10.(a), which reports the absolute connection resiliency as a function of
time. From this Figure we can also estimate that the collapse occurs after about 145
days of exercise. This is useful to guide developer choices or to schedule maintenance
actions in advance. For instance, for a WSN with a mission time of 120 days (i.e.,
before the collapse) and a 15 nodes minimum coverage, gossiping and ﬂooding may
still represent a reasonable choice, for the given workload and failure rate.
The situation changes when considering a more stressful workload (Experiment 2,
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.13: Network overhead (log scale) induced by routing algorithms over time;
regular multi-hop and random are not reported, since they do not introduce overhead.
(a) Experiment 1: ﬂooding and gossiping present almost the same large overhead;
reliable multi-hop overhead increases as the network ages, due to the reduction of
available nodes and (good quality) paths to the sink. (b) Experiment 2: ﬂooding and
gossiping overhead drops earlier, due to the shorter lifetime of the network; reliable
multi-hop overhead has a peak value at 78 days of exercise, corresponding to the sharp
drop in both data and connection resiliency (Figs. 7.10.(b) and 7.12.(b)). (c) Exper-
iment 3: the peak for reliable multi-hop overhead shifts left (at 15 days), justifying
the earlier drop in data and connection resiliency (Figs. 7.10.(c) and 7.12.(c)).
Figures 7.9.(b) and 7.10.(b)). In this case, ﬂooding and gossiping are not a suitalble
choice since they tend to overload the network, shortening the lifetime of forwarding
nodes that exhaust their energy budget sooner than when running random, multihop,
and reliable multihop routing algorithms. In particular, as shown in Figure 7.9.(b),
the random routing outperforms the others in terms of the connection resiliency.
However, looking only at connection resiliency may lead to incorrect conclusions. As
a matter of fact, random routing is not able to deliver more than the 24% of the
produced data (see Figure 7.11.(b) reporting the relative data delivery resiliency as
a function of the number of failures). This result is conﬁrmed also for Experiment
1 (see Figure 7.11.(a)). Hence, a judicious choice may be to adopt reliable multihop
Chapter 7. Case Studies 140
that enables the network to deliver a larger amount of data to the sink thanks to its
transmission control policy.
This result was expected due to the presence of lossy links and to the absence
of retransmission mechanisms, as anticipated in sections 3.2 and 5.3. Random rout-
ing performs even worse than regular multi-hop, due to the simplicity of its parent
selection function which does not always select the best node over the path to the
sink. However, this situation changes as network ages, especially in the case of a
more stressful workload. Looking at Figures 7.11.(b) and 7.12.(b) it is worth noting
that after 127 days, corresponding to 16 failures, reliable multi-hop is outperformed
by regular multi-hop, and, after 162 days (19 failures), it is outperformed even by
random routing. In other terms, as the network ages, and the number of alive sen-
sors starts to decrease, it is more resilient to send packets randomly, rather than
consuming resources for reliable transmission (the rate of retransmitted packets in-
creases due to the worse quality of available paths). This eﬀect can also be observed
in ﬁgure 7.13.(a): the overhead induced by reliable multi-hop increases over time.
This suggests the adoption of adaptive routing strategies, able to change the adopted
routing policy according to the current resiliency level.
7.4.4 Results from High Failure Rate Scenario
All mentioned observations are mitigated when the WSN manifests higher failure
rates (Experiment 3). In this case, the connection resiliency (Figures 7.9.(c) and
7.10.(c)) does not help for selecting the best routing algorithm, since hardware faults
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become the predominant cause of node failures, and the diﬀerent behavior of rout-
ing algorithms does not impact on the failure dynamics. On the other hand, data
delivery resiliency (Figures 7.11.(c) and 7.12.(c)) is still useful to observe signiﬁcant
diﬀerences, suggesting that i) redundant (ﬂooding and gossiping) and reliable algo-
rithms are the best choice to face the higher number of failures, as expected, and ii)
the diﬀerence between redundant and reliable algorithms is not as relevant as in the
former experiments, hence a reasonable choice is to select ﬂooding or gossiping, since
they are simpler to implement.
Table 7.7: Nodes with the shortest evaluated lifetime, for each experiment and routing
algorithm
Flooding Gossiping Multi-hop Reliable multi-hop Random
Exp node ID lifetime node ID lifetime node ID lifetime node ID lifetime node ID lifetime
days days days days days
12 120,7 12 119,6 21 132,6 11 129,2 20 136,7
6 123,8 6 124,4 23 136,8 22 131,2 22 138,1
1 4 124,7 7 124,7 29 137,0 24 132,0 28 138,2
7 125,1 4 124,9 17 137,6 1 132,6 13 138,8
15 125,6 13 124,9 4 137,9 7 133,6 15 138,8
13 126,6 10 126,6 25 138,4 4 134,2 1 139,7
12 4,9 12 4,9 4 59,2 16 68,1 29 41,4
6 5,1 13 5,1 19 70,4 15 73,3 27 95,4
2 13 5,1 14 5,2 11 71,7 14 86,9 15 97,5
14 5,3 6 5,3 7 80,7 6 88,5 3 98,8
3 5,3 3 5,4 12 91,1 5 97,0 18 100,1
4 5,4 4 5,4 15 96,0 4 104,8 25 102,9
29 21,6 19 22,3 5 23,0 1 22,5 26 23,0
6 22,8 8 22,4 7 23,3 5 23,5 13 23,2
3 22 23,2 1 22,9 27 23,3 25 23,8 9 23,3
20 23,4 10 23,3 21 23,5 26 24,0 2 23,4
8 23,5 20 23,5 29 23,5 27 24,0 14 23,5
9 23,7 23 23,6 11 23,8 18 24,1 19 23,6
7.4.5 Discussion
Table 7.7 reports lifetime results. In particular, the table lists the nodes with the
shortest evaluated lifetime for each experiment and routing algorithm. This is use-
ful to highlight dependability bottlenecks and to gain more insight on the failure
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behavior. For instance, in experiments 1 and 2 ﬂooding and gossiping tend to dis-
charge inner nodes ﬁrst, e.g., nodes number 12 and 6 which are deployed on the
suspended roadway and which are forwarders to the sink for the other nodes. This
causes network disconnection earlier than other algorithms. In particular, concerning
experiment 2, the estimated lifetime of the ﬁrst failing nodes is about 5 days, against
61 days of average network lifetime (see Table 7.8). Hence, after only 5 days, the
majority of nodes result isolated, which justiﬁes the collapse observable in Figure
7.11.(b) and 7.12.(b). This eﬀect is not observed for the remaining algorithms. For
instance, reliable multi-hop tend to stress the nodes which are closer to the sink (e.g.,
nodes 16, 15 and 14). In other terms, the more a node is close to the sink, the more
traﬃc and retransmissions it has to manage, the faster it will discharge its battery.
At the same time, both data and connection resiliency are better than in the previous
case, since: i) the most stressed nodes for reliable multi-hop exhibit a lifetime of one
order magnitude greater than the one estimated for ﬂooding and gossiping (e.g. 68
days for node 16 with reliable multi-hop against 5 days for node 12 with ﬂooding),
and ii) being closer to the sink, these nodes have a larger set of redundant paths
to the sink. More detailed results can be achieved by looking at the traces of the
experiments. For instance, we are able to evaluate how many transient failures occur
on each node, when they occur, and what consequences they imply, e.g., in terms
of lost packets. Also, we can study the path followed by each packet ﬂowing in the
network, assessing if it reaches the sink, if (and where) it is lost and why (e.g., due
to a node failure, a link failure, or a TTL expiration), and if it is retransmitted.
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Table 7.8: Summary of experiments
Table 7.8 reports a summary of the experimental results achievable with the
proposed approach. In particular the Table reports the connection and data delivery
resiliency obtained for each experiment in terms of the days and number of failures
after which the resiliency becomes lower than 75% In addition the table includes
the average node lifetime, the average time spent in isolation by the nodes, and the
simulation time needed to perform one batch of simulation for each experiment.
The table is useful to have a quick understanding of the results. For instance, it is
clear that the random routing exhibits the best performance in terms of connection
resiliency, especially for experiment 2. This is conﬁrmed by lifetime and isolation
results: nodes equipped with random routing usually live longer (e.g., 137.4 days
for experiment 2 against 122.6 days of reliable multi-hop) and are connected to the
sink (e.g., only 13.3 days of isolation for experiment 2, against 29 days of reliable
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multi-hop). On the other hand, nodes are not able to deliver their packets to the
sink, since data delivery resiliency equals 0.24 at most. This again conﬁrms that
data delivery resiliency is very useful to countermeasure traditional metrics, such
as connection resiliency and nodes lifetime. Reliable multi-hop appears to be best
trade-oﬀ in terms of connection and data delivery resiliency results, and it also leads
to lifetime and isolation results which are comparable to regular multi-hop. As for
ﬂooding and gossiping, it is interesting to look at the results obtained for experiment
2. After only 2 failures, and after about 6 days of operation, both connection and
data delivery resiliency becomes lower than 75%. This is consistent with the short
nodes lifetime (i.e., about 62 days) and with the long isolation time: nodes spend
about 60% of their time, on average, being isolated from the sink. This is due to the
fact that ﬂooding and gossiping tend to discharge inner nodes ﬁrst, leaving a large
set of nodes isolated from the sink after only few days of operation.
The simulation time for each experiment is reported to give evidence of the prac-
tical feasibility of the approach. In our settings the time needed for one batch is
less than 200 seconds in most of the cases. From the table is however evident that
the time needed changes depending on the complexity of the particular experiment.
For instance, more time is needed for experiment 2, which implies more events to
be processed (due to the more stressful workload). On the opposite, experiment 3
require less time, due to the higher failure rate which shorten nodes lifetime. Also,
the simulation of ﬂooding and gossiping requires more time due to the larger amount
of packets to be simulated.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis addressed the problem of the resiliency assessment of WSN. Assessing
the resiliency of WSNs is a crucial task in designing dependable WSNs, since it
could help to i) anticipate critical choices e.g., concerning node placement, running
software, routing and MAC protocols, ii) mitigate risks, e.g., by forecasting the time
when the WSN will not be able to perform with a suitable level of resiliency, and iii)
prevent money loss, e.g., providing a criteria to plan and schedule maintenance actions
eﬀectively. Nowadays, the lack of eﬀective approaches for the resiliency assessment
of WSNs is the major cause of distrust of industries that are still questioning the
adoption of WSN in critical application scenario, despite WSNs represent a good
opportunity to reduce the installation and maintenance cost of more than one order
of magnitude. However, in order to assess the resiliency of WSNs, two main challenges
must be overcome.
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1. Deﬁnition of Resiliency. Resiliency has been deﬁned as the persistence of de-
pendability when facing ”changes”[12], and past research eﬀorts have been de-
voted to deﬁne the concept of connection (or network) resiliency, i.e., the num-
ber of “changes”, in terms of node failures, that can be accommodated while
preserving a speciﬁc degree of connectivity in the network. However, while this
concept still applies to WSNs, it is not enough to characterize the data-driven
nature of WSNs. The service delivered by the WSN does not encompass only
the connection, but also the computation, i.e., even when sensor nodes are
potentially connected ( a path exists between nodes and the sink node), data
losses can still occur.
2. Complexity of the assessment. It is easy to ﬁgure that, even assessing only the
connection resiliency of WSN is dramatically exacerbated by the complexity of
potential changes that may take place at runtime. The workload, included the
use of aggregation/fusion algorithms, impacts on the number of packets sent on
the network. The path followed by packets depends on the routing algorithm,
on the topology, and on the wireless medium (packets can be lost). The energy
proﬁle is aﬀected by the workload, by the number of forwarded packets, and by
the battery technology. All above factors impact on the failure behavior, e.g.,
a node can fail due to battery exhaustion. A node can also fail independently,
due to faults in the sensing hardware. In turn, a failure of a node may induce a
partition of the network into two or more subsets, involving a large set of nodes
to be unavailable, i.e., isolated, hence, unable to send acquired data to the sink.
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Clearly, such high degree of inter-dependence complicates the assessment task,
by dramatically increasing the number of variables and dynamics to encompass.
Hence, important questions to answer are : i) how the node workload, hardware
platforms, topology and routing protocols impact on the failure proneness of
nodes and of the network, and, vice-versa, ii) how node and network failures
impacts on the nominal behavior of the WSN (e.g., how the failure of a node
mutates the behavior of running workload or routing protocols.
This thesis deﬁned the concept of data delivery resiliency and qualiﬁes the concept of
WSN resiliency as a non functional properties composed by both connection resiliency
and data delivery resiliency. Data delivery resiliency is deﬁned as the number of
failures (or the longer time interval) the WSN can sustain (a WSN can survive)
while delivering an amount of data to the sink node greater than a threshold. The
concept of data delivery resiliency relates to i) the computational load on nodes which
may causes packet losses due to buﬀer overrun, ii) application requirements, e.g. at
least a given amount of produced measurements must be delivered to the sink node
iii) routing and MAC protocols impacting on the data delivery features and packet
error rate and iv) radio interferences and packet loss/corruption phenomena on the
propagation medium. The variation in the amount of useful data received by the
sink due to disconnection failures that can be tolerated by the WSN depends on the
requirements of the application.
In order to assess the resiliency mastering the intrinsic complexity, this thesis
proposed a novel and holistic approach for the resiliency assessment of WSNs. Key
Chapter 8. Conclusions 148
focus of the proposed approach is the holistic assessment, i.e., the comprehensive
assessment performed by taking into account all subsystems and inter-related factors
concurring to the behavior of the WSN.
To master the assessment complexity, the approach separates the assessment of
the failure behavior from the evaluation of the nominal behavior by considering i)
a set of parametric analytical failure models, and ii) a WSN behavioral model, re-
spectively. The behavioral model is exploited to conﬁgure the WSNs in terms of
hardware platform, topology, routing and MAC protocols, and to study the nominal
behavior of the software, included the OS, and the power consumption of the nodes.
Evaluations performed with the behavioral models are used to gather values for fail-
ure model parameters of the WSN under study, such as the packet forwarding rate
of each node. Then the power of the analytical failure model is exploited to evaluate
a set of metrics of interest such as the resiliency. The approach delegates the eﬀort
of re-computing dynamic parameters which vary during the evaluation of the failure
model, to an external component, namely the External Engine which orchestrates the
evolution of the failure model. The external engine can be regarded as a supervision
entity encapsulating and managing aspects that are generally diﬃcult or onerous to
express at the level of abstraction of analytical models, such as routing protocols and
topology.
Another goal obtained following the proposed approach is the automated failure
model generation. By decoupling the analytical models from “changes“ management
issues, the External Engine allows to simplify the failure model which can adapt to
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each manifesting change, transparently, e.g., by invoking facilities provided by the
External Engine. The extreme simpliﬁcation obtained, allowed the implementation
of a Failure Model Template Library which is used to generate the ﬁnal WSN failure
model consistently with the WSN observed in the behavioral simulation, thus avoid-
ing manual modeling phases when changing the structure or the features of the WSN
under study.
Relying on an automated modeling phase, the proposed approach allows ﬁnal
users (i.e., WSN developers) to work within their knowledge domain, without requir-
ing speciﬁc modeling and/or programming skills. In other terms, developers interact
with artifacts that are related to their domain, such as behavioral simulators.
Other than providing speciﬁc considerations on the presented case studies, this
chapter summarizes the general lessons which have been learned and that can be
reasonably taken into account when assessing the resiliency of WSN or developing
resilient WSN.
8.0.6 Lessons Learned
The approach has been experimented considering a set of realistic case studies, relat-
ing to diﬀerent hardware platform, routing protocols, topology and applications. A
Quantitative evaluation concerning MTTF, lifetime, network overhead, data delivery
resiliency and connection resiliency (both against the time and the number of mani-
fested failures), has been provided. Performed simulations shown how the approach
can be used to pinpoint critical nodes. Moreover, achieved results also shown to be
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useful to i) guide possible resiliency improvement strategies, for instance to quan-
titatively and judiciously conﬁgure the topology and software of nodes in terms of
duty-cycle, size of radio packet and adopted routing algorithm, and ii) to evaluate
possible cost-dependability trade-oﬀs. In particular, we demonstrate that, concern-
ing a simple in line topology, we obtained an overall MTTF improvement (e.g., 21%
for the last node in the topology for a given setting), by increasing the cost of 30%
(three more nodes in the network).
Achieved results allowed us also to justify the need of complementing the concept
of connection resiliency with the concept of data delivery resiliency. Experiments
showed that connection resiliency can be misleading for characterizing the overall
resiliency level of a WSNs and that data delivery resiliency is very useful to counter-
measure traditional metrics, such as connection resiliency and nodes lifetime, adding
one further element to discriminate between diﬀerent solutions. For instance, experi-
ments demonstrated that the random routing exhibits the best performance in terms
of connection resiliency, especially for stressing workload. This is conﬁrmed by life-
time and isolation results: nodes equipped with random routing usually live longer
and are longer connected to the sink wasting a short time as isolated. However, it
is not able to deliver a suﬃcient amount of data to the sink showing a data delivery
resiliency equals 0.24 at most.
Interesting results come also across the evaluation of the sensitivity of the resiliency
against varying failure rates and routing algorithms. Results show that in the case
of high failure rate, the resiliency of a WSN is not sensitive to workload parameters
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and routing algorithms, which on the other side became a tricky task for low failure
rates. In the case of low failure rate, and low workload, epidemic and reliable routing
protocols are able to deliver the same level of connection and data delivery resiliency,
while in the case of low failure rate and high workload the use of acknowledgment-
based multi-hop is the best choice for preserving acceptable levels in data delivery
and connection resiliency in a large time horizon, since epidemic algorithms tend to
discharge inner nodes ﬁrst, leaving a large set of nodes isolated from the sink after
only few days of operation.
However, WSN aging phenomena and network degradation suggest that, from a given
instant of time (or after a given number of manifested failures ), random walk routing
represents a good backup solution to reliable multi-hop, enabling a longer lifetime
and higher network resiliency due to its null overhead and uniform node discharge
features. Consequently, performed analysis showed that the WSN resiliency may
beneﬁt of a routing policy switching at a given point.
This thesis demonstrated that in order to assess the resiliency of a complex system,
a holistic assessment strategy is needed. Moreover, the proposed approach poses also
an intriguing challenge for interested industries in the ﬁeld of (and not limited to)
sensor networks, consisting in the chance of releasing failure model libraries upon the
release of WSN hardware, following the same approach as for HDL libraries. This
way, following the presented approach, the resiliency assessment may play a central
role in making the vision of the successful and trustworthy adoption of WSNs in
critical scenarios come true.
Appendix A
Appendix A
A.1 Basic Notion of Dependability and Resiliency
In [141] computer system dependability was deﬁned as ” the quality of the delivered
service such that reliance can justiﬁably be placed on this service”. This notion has
evolved over the years. Recent eﬀort from the same community deﬁnes the depend-
ability as ”the ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe
than is acceptable” [142]. This last deﬁnition has been introduced since it does not
stress the need for justiﬁcation of reliance.
The dependability is a composed non-functional attribute, that encompasses the
following sub-attributes:
• Availability: readiness for correct service. A system is said to be available at
a the time t if it is able to provide a correct service at that instant of time. The
availability can thus be thought as the expected value E(A(t)) of the following
A(t) function:
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A(t) =
{
1 if proper service at t
0 otherwise
(A.1)
In other terms, the availability is the fraction of time that the system is oper-
ational;
• Reliability: continuity of correct service. The reliability R(t) of a system is
the conditional probability of delivering a correct service in the interval [0; t],
given that the service was correct at the reference time 0 [RIF]:
R(0; t) = P (no failures in [0; t] | correct service in 0) (A.2)
Since reliability is a function of the mission duration T, mean time to failure
(MTTF) is often used as a single numeric indicator of system reliability [RIF
82]. In particular, the time to failure (TTF) of a system is deﬁned as the
interval of time between a system recovery and the consecutive failure.
• Safety: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environ-
ment;
• Conﬁdentiality: absence of improper system alterations;
• Maintainability: ability of a system to be easily repaired after the occurrence
of a failure. A commonly adopted indicator for the maintainability is the mean
time to recover (MTTR). In particular, the time to recover (TTR) can be
deﬁned as the time needed to perform a repair, that is, the interval of time
between a failure and its consequent recovery.
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Recently, the notion of dependability is shifting more and more to the concept
of resiliency [12]: the persistence of dependability when facing ”changes”. This
change of perspective leads to new requirements of modern fault tolerant systems,
such as the ability of accommodating unforeseen environmental perturbations or
disturbances. At same time, the concept of resiliency dictates the need for new
evaluation approaches, since, resiliency assessment approaches now must deal with
i) dependability assessment when ii) changes manifests in driving and environmental
variables. However, as will be detailed later in Chapter 2, still a little attention is
devoted in this new perspective due to limitation of past approaches.
A.1.1 Threats
The causes that lead a system to deliver an incorrect service, i.e., a service deviating
from its function, are manifold and can manifest at any phase of its life-cycle. Hard-
ware faults and design errors are just an example of the possible sources of failure.
These causes, along with the manifestation of incorrect service, are recognized in the
literature as dependability threats, and are commonly categorized as failures, errors,
and faults [142].
A failure is an event that occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct
service. A service fails either because it does not comply with the functional speciﬁ-
cation, or because this speciﬁcation did not adequately describe the system function.
A service failure is a transition from correct service to incorrect service. The period
of delivery of incorrect service is referred as service outage. The transition from
incorrect service to correct service is a service recovery or repair action.
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An error can be regarded as the part of a system’s total state that may lead to a
failure. In other words, a failure occurs when the error causes the delivered service
to deviate from correct service. The adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error is
called a fault.
Failures, errors, and faults are related each other in the form of a chain of threats.
A fault is active when it produces an error; otherwise, it is dormant. A failure occurs
when an error is propagated to the service interface and causes the service delivered
by the system to deviate from correct service. An error which does not lead the
system to failure is said to be a latent error. A failure of a system component causes
an internal fault of the system that contains such a component, or causes an external
fault for the other system(s) that receive service from the given system.
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